The Antecedents and Consequences of Resistance to Take-overs

  • Rita D. Kosnik
  • Thomas A. Turk

Abstract

In the 1980s, corporate America underwent dramatic structural changes as a result of a new merger wave. Throughout the decade, the number of mergers and acquisitions, and their dollar value, hit record highs. For instance, in the 1985–6 period, over 3000 transactions a year were recorded which, combined, accounted for over $120 billion. Throughout the decade, more than $1.3 trillion was spent on merger and take-over transactions (Business Week 1990). Compared with previous merger waves, the recent merger wave stands out because of three new developments: the size of the merger deals, the controversies created by hostile take-overs, and the proliferation of resistance tactics by the management of target firms.

Keywords

Petroleum Income Conglomerate Defend Sonal 

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Copyright information

© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 1994

Authors and Affiliations

  • Rita D. Kosnik
  • Thomas A. Turk

There are no affiliations available

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