Abstract
Over the past few years, the traditional view that market structure largely determines the conduct (or behaviour) of firms in a market, and industry structure determines industry performance, has lost ground. The New Industrial Organization literature insists on the central role of market conduct, the necessity of detailed analysis of business behaviour and the usefulness of well-defined microeconomic models to understand the complex relationships characterizing the structure-conduct-performance paradigm (1). Given the dynamic nature of strategic competition, each firm knows that, over time, its behaviour can have an effect upon the other firms and that its best plan of action depends upon the plans chosen by its rivals. Firms must then be conceived as actors able to modify to some extent their environment instead of being subject to it. In this perspective the configuration of industrial structures and organizational forms is as much the outcome of deliberate strategies as it is of initial conditions and predetermined rules of the game (2).
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© 1992 SIPI Srl, Rivista di Politica Economica
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Jacquemin, A. (1992). Collusive Behaviour, R&D, and European Policy. In: Baldassarri, M. (eds) Oligopoly and Dynamic Competition. Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12818-1_7
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