Abstract
Until recent years, the basic paradigm of Industrial Economics (Industrial Organization in US terminology) — at least in its simplest form — emphasizes the causal links between market structure and business conduct in determining market performance. For our purposes, it suffices to briefly outline the framework in which the so-called SCP approach was elaborated. Basic conditions (costs, demand) determine market structure (degrees of concentration and product differentiation, barriers to entry, vertical integration and conglomerate diversification) which determine conduct (business goals and strategies), which in turn determine market performance (efficiency, profitability, pace of technical progress).
It is a pleasure to thank Mario Baldassarri, Lorenzo Bianchi, Chong Choi and Carlo Scarpa for discussions and constructive criticisms on earlier drafts. The usual disclaimer applies.
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© 1992 SIPI Srl, Rivista di Politica Economica
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Delbono, F. (1992). Potential Competition and Entry Deterring Strategies: Welfare Effects and Policy Implications. In: Baldassarri, M. (eds) Oligopoly and Dynamic Competition. Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12818-1_5
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