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The Reconstruction of Keynesian Economics: Works in Progress

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Keynes and the Economic Policies of the 1980s

Part of the book series: Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy ((CICETP))

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Abstract

The present paper has a twofold purpose. First, though not in a comprehensive way, it is meant to account for the chief results of some streams of research that in the last few years have contributed to the general effort of theorists to give a rigorous microeconomic foundation to Keynesian economics. In the second place its purpose is to provide a modest methodological insight aimed at unifying all these different, and apparently unconnected, fragments of theory.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Università di Torino, Italy

    Alberto Cassone

Authors
  1. Alberto Cassone
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Rome, ‘La Sapienza’, Italy

    Mario Baldassarri (Professor of Economics) (Professor of Economics)

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© 1992 SIPI Srl, Rivista di Politica Economica

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Cassone, A. (1992). The Reconstruction of Keynesian Economics: Works in Progress. In: Baldassarri, M. (eds) Keynes and the Economic Policies of the 1980s. Central Issues in Contemporary Economic Theory and Policy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12815-0_3

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