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Abstract

In assessing the impact of reputation on deterrence we face a problem that is both theoretical and operational. The interconnectedness theory predicts that defeats or other evidence of weakness or inattention will erode a country’s reputation and encourage challenges to its commitments, but supporters of this notion have not indicated how soon these effects take hold, how long they last, or, more generally, how susceptible to change are the images leaders have of their adversaries. Because one event or series of events may shape images of credibility so strongly that several future episodes are affected, there are potential pitfalls in sole reliance on a case by case approach. Hence, it seems wiser to begin with an examination of a much larger ‘unit of analysis’, an entire turn of the cycle in the US-Soviet rivalry, taken as a whole.

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  1. This characterisation can be overdrawn, though. Stalin’s reckless plunge into collectivisation in 1929 was hardly evidence of caution in domestic politics and the supposedly impetuous Khrushchev, despite his outward confidence regarding the probability of an American response to the construction of the wall, began with a barrier of barbed wire and told a disappointed Walter Ulbricht in early August 1961 that he was not to go ‘one millimeter farther’ in Berlin. Peter Wyden, Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989) pp. 85–90.

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© 1992 John Orme

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Orme, J.D. (1992). US Reputation and Soviet Expansion. In: Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12794-8_5

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