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Covert Misadventure, Failed Summitry

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Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles

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Abstract

Beginning in 1958, the Soviet leadership presented challenges to the West on a truly global scale, leading four years later to what are generally seen as the most dangerous moments in the cold war. The confrontation began in Berlin, shifted outside of Europe to three regions of the third world, then returned to Berlin, and was finally resolved in the Caribbean. The relationships between the events will be clearest if the material is discussed in chronological order.

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Notes

  1. Philip Windsor, City on Leave: A History of Berlin 1945–1962 (New York: Praeger, 1963) 199–204;

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  3. À point stressed by defenders of Lucius Clay’s convoy proposal. See Peter Wyden, Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989) p. 195.

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  49. Victor Marchetti and John Marks, The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (New York: Dell, 1974) p. 214.

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  54. Robert Slusser, ‘The Berlin Crises’, in Barry Blechman (ed.), Force without War (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1978) pp. 422, 425, 432–3.

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  55. One possible explanation is that statesmens’ views about credibility are sometimes simply slow to change. That is, once an strong impression is formed, it takes a great deal of evidence to alter it, particularly with a highly motivated adversary. This might account for why Khrushchev was willing to challenge the US again even if one believes that Kennedy had demonstrated a reasonable level of resolve in Berlin. See Robert Jervis, ‘Deterrence and Perception’, in Steven E. Miller (ed.), Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) pp. 63, 78–81. Slusser views the steps taken as adequate to send a message of resolve. ‘The Berlin Crises of 1958–9 and 1961’, pp. 436–9.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, USA

    John D. Orme (Research Fellow)

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© 1992 John Orme

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Orme, J.D. (1992). Covert Misadventure, Failed Summitry. In: Deterrence, Reputation and Cold-War Cycles. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12794-8_3

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