Abstract
Oligopoly theory occupies a peculiar position in economic analysis. On the one hand, lavish theoretical attention is bestowed upon it in the form of game-theoretic and bargaining models, entry-barrier theory, and core theory.1 Yet the ghosts of Cournot, Bertrand, Edgeworth, and Stackelberg process and equilibrium analysis continue to parade through the pages of textbooks, frequently updated to relate them to Nash or core equilibrium concepts.
Published originally as Ch. 1, Robert E. Kuenne, Rivalrous Consonance: A Theory of General Oligopolistic Equilibrium, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1986, pp. 1–18, and reproduced with permission of Elsevier Science Publishers. Cross-references to chapters refer to the original publication.
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© 1992 Robert E. Kuenne
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Kuenne, R.E. (1992). The Rivalrous Consonance Framework for Oligopoly Analysis. In: General Equilibrium Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12752-8_9
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