De-escalation and Soviet Nuclear Operations
Many writings have appeared over the years on nuclear forces and nuclear strategy. This chapter focuses on the prospect that certain de-escalatory measures will allow and even encourage Soviets leaders to ‘stand down’ (i.e. return to peacetime operations) their nuclear forces after a crisis, despite conflicting motives for keeping forces on alert. Standing-down forces is one of many de-escalatory measures the Soviet and the United States might consider as a way to build confidence in nuclear crisis termination.
KeywordsNuclear Weapon Nuclear Force Nuclear Exchange Cruise Missile Conventional Force
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