Leibniz’s Teleological Theodicy

Abstract

Theodicy derives from the Greek theos (God) and dike (justice), meaning ‘the vindication of the divine attributes’.¹ G. W. Leibniz (1646–1716) is famous for introducing this term to the problem; he titles his essays on the goodness of God, human freedom, and the origin of evil, Theodicy.² But his work provides much more than an appellation for the problem of evil. Leibniz provides one of the earliest formal and systematic teleological theodicies. In the defence of the consistency of the divine attributes with evil, he examines the theoretical issues underlying the challenge of evil. In Dostoevsky we saw theodicy developed and its problems discussed in a very vivid, practical manner, which culminated in negative conclusions. Leibniz contrasts this approach in emphasising ‘the more speculative and metaphysical difficulties’ (p. 135:20),³ and in maintaining a positive view about the success of the defence. In this chapter I will draw out the key features of Leibniz’s treatment of the problem of evil and discuss its strengths and weaknesses through the criticisms raised against it, directly by Voltaire and John Hick, and indirectly by Dostoevsky. Though Leibniz’s theodicy fails on a number of significant points, it does provide the basic teleological structure necessary to effective theodicy.