Abstract
The United States and West Germany had different expectations of détente. Consequently, they differed on the question of priority attributed to defence and co-operation.
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Notes
Tom Foley (Democrat), the Speaker of the House of Representatives, quoted in the Financial Times, 6 June 1990.
Joint Economic Committee, East-West Commercial Policy, 1982, p. 30.
By 1970 the inner-German trade turnover had reached DM4.4 billion. The total value of preferences which the GDR enjoyed as a result of the arrangements for inner-German trade were, according to R. Biskup, definitely not less than DM500 million. See Biskup, Deutschland’s offene Handelsgrenze, Frankfurt/Main, 1976, cited in Lisiecki (1990, p. 525).
Given the West German economist S.Nehring’s assumption that the GDR’s benefits amounted to about 30 per cent of their deliveries to West Germany, one should estimate the total annual gains in the late 1980s at about DM2 billion. For details, see S. Nehring, Die Wirkungen von Handelspräferenzen im Warenaustausch zwischen der Bundesrepublik und der DDR, Kieler Studien, Nr 154, Tübingen, 1978 (cited in Lisiecki, 1990, p. 525).
Jacques Attali, President of EBRD, quoted in The Guardian, 15 April 1991.
VW chief Carl Hahn, interviewed by Die Zeit, 23 February 1990.
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© 1992 Hélène Seppain
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Seppain, H. (1992). Détente and After: Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade in 1970–91. In: Contrasting US and German Attitudes to Soviet Trade, 1917–91. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12602-6_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12602-6_10
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