Abstract
Those who opposed the creation of a Russian high seas fleet regarded the four Baltic dreadnoughts as the thin end of the wedge, and were quite right. The decision to build those four ships had been long-drawn-out, but from the Navy Ministry’s point of view it had been worth it. The road was now open for further expansion. Without such expansion, it could be argued, the dreadnoughts would be isolated. On the one hand they would lack the supporting cruisers, destroyers and other vessels that made up what the Ministry termed a ‘balanced fleet like other countries have’. On the other hand they would be part of a battle squadron, the other half of which would be four pre-dreadnoughts, and from the technical point of view the mix of old and new battleships would not work. Therefore the pre-dreadnoughts needed to be replaced by four more modern ships. What the Navy Ministry envied was Tirpitz’s Navy Law, a legislative act that was a plan for naval construction over many years. The vision was of a well-planned programme that would see the two big state shipyards constantly at work, with a new keel-laying immediately following each launch. Production would be more efficient, the drawing board to flag-raising period would be shorter, and the Navy Ministry would need to spend less of its time on lobbying.
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Notes and References
Minutes quoted in Shatsillo (1968), 323. The War Ministry dreaded an enemy occupation of Kronstadt; the dread was understandable, the likelihood remote.
Quoted in Shatsillo (1968), 328–9.
Shatsillo (1968), 335.
Shatsillo (1968), 67.
Polivanov (1924), 14 Dec. 1909.
Grigorovich (1990), VIET, no. 3, 118.
Petrov (1926), 145.
Krylov (1979), 180–4, gives the text of the speech he wrote for Grigorovich
The various discussions over this period are dealt with more fully by Shatsillo (1968), 68–78, and Petrov (1924), 130–60.
For a detailed description of these ships see V.Yu. Usov, ‘Lineinye kreisery tipa “Izmail”’, Sudostroeniye, 1986, no. 7, 61–4 and no. 8, 56–9. The draught of these ships would not have prevented passage of the Suez Canal, because the latter was being deepened.
Grigorovich diary, VIET, no. 4, 1990, 92, 95.
Misleading silhouettes were favoured by the MGSh at this period. Before World War I (according to Barnaby (1964), 57) some British destroyers were built with two funnels instead of the more convenient three or four, allegedly so that they would resemble the rather weaker torpedo boats.
In the Royal Navy up to 1919 destroyer machinery and fuel averaged 50 per cent of total displacement.
The Times, 9 Sept. 1907.
The effect of water depth on maximum speeds was an active subject for enquiry at this time and in 1907 the Tartar results were challenged by no less than Sir Philip Watts, who tried Cossack over a shallow and a deep mile. In his paper to the INA in 1908 Watts reported that shallow water was a drag up to about 30 knots, after which it gave a benefit of about one knot. At 18000hp Cossack could only reach 33 knots in deep water. Curiously, when a Black Sea ‘Novik,’ Bystryi, ran its trials over a relatively shallow (20m) mile it could only reach 29 knots at 30000hp, much of its energy being used to pull an enormous stern wave behind it. The Transactions of the INA in 1905–8 touch variously on these problems. See also Krylov (1979), 360, 365, 367.
Barnaby (1964), 57–8.
Most of the factual content of this section is based on Stepanov and Tsvetkov(1981).
V.Yu. Usov, ‘Eskadrennye minonostsy tipa “Derzkii”’, in Sudostroeniye, no. 7, 1984, 62–6.
Nikitin (1973), 200.
He should have become aware in 1908, from the Transactions of the Institution of Naval Architects, that the actual horsepowers achieved in the British trials were higher than the contract power, but he may not have been aware of by how much, and even if he was he may not have had the opportunity to amend his conclusions. It should be added, however, that the precise division of design work between Russians and Germans remains controversial. The claim that the ship was German-designed is exaggerated, but Vulkan certainly played a large role in the process and it could have been Vulkan, not Bubnov, that was responsible for any miscalculations.
Stepanov and Tsvetkov (1981), 91.
Stepanov and Tsvetkov (1981), 112.
V.Yu. Usov, ‘Esckadrennye minonostsy tipa “Gogland”’, in Sudostroeniye, 1987 no. 4, 70.
There may be two sides to this story, because torpedo tubes might have required less support after 1913, when Putilov introduced its new mount, which fired torpedoes electrically at one-second intervals, thereby reducing the maximum possible recoil. See Stepanov and Tsvetkov (1981), 98 and TsGAVMF F401.1.233.41.
On 15 March 1913 a GUK conference approved this idea, and relevant drawings were sent to companies building these ships. See Stepanov and Tsvetkov (1981), 98.
Krylov (1979), 280.
The following paragraphs are based on R.M. Melnikov, ‘Legkie kreisery tipa “Svetlana”’, in Sudostroeniye, no. 12, 1980, 54–7, and Tsvetkov, (1990), 51–67.
Grigorovich, VIET, no. 3, 121 and VIET no. 4, 94.
Petrov (1926), 137–9.
Petrov (1926), 169–71.
Tsvetkov (1983), 117–23, is the main source for this section.
For Lastochka, see Sudostroeniye, no 12, 1984, 48. For turbines, see V. Kornilovich, ‘Iz zapisok russkogo inzhenera’ in Zvezda, no. 12, 1962, 152–63.
N.I. Dmitriev was more than an engineer. According to Shatsillo (1968), 301, he had pulled strings to get Grigorovich appointed Navy Minister, in return for which he had received orders for his Russud. Shatsillo adds that Grigorovich received a packet of Russud shares at that time.
Much of this section relies on Halpern (1971), 295–313.
Petrov (1926), 171–2.
Lambi (1984), 396–7, 399, 405–6.
The two biggest, Ladoga and Narova, were old armoured ships of the 1870s, subsequently converted to minelaying, and the two smaller, Amur and Yenesei, had been projected before Tsushima.
Because of the unwillingness of many Russian crews to obey orders, and the throwing away of some initial advantages by the Russian command, the Moon Sound battle was a German victory. But it would have been an extremely expensive victory had the Russian coastal batteries and small craft been handled in the way intended. See Mawdsley (1978), 86–96.
V.Yu.Usov, ‘Proekty kreiserov-zagraditelei sudostroitel’noi programmy 1915g’ in Sudostroeniye, no. 1, 1988, 50–3.
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© 1994 J.N. Westwood
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Westwood, J.N. (1994). Towards a Balanced Fleet. In: Russian Naval Construction, 1905–45. Studies in Soviet History and Society. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12458-9_3
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