Abstract
In the United States, an “intellectual property bargain” underlies the concept of intellectual-property protection. This “bargain” between creators and society balances two social objectives: 1) it encourages the production and dissemination of new works and inventions (by providing economic incentives to creators), and 2) it promotes access to and use of these works and inventions.1 Thus, the limited monopoly granted to authors by copyright and to inventors by patents is a quid-pro-quo arrangement to serve the public interest, rather than a system established primarily to guarantee income to creators. (See app. A for reviews of copyright, patent, and trade secret protections as they pertain to software.)
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Notes
See Peter S. Menell, “An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs,” Stanford Law Review, vol. 41, 1989, p. 1047.
For discussion of this view, see Morton David Goldberg and John F. Burleigh, “Copyright Protection for Computer Programs,” AIPLA Quarterly Journal, vol. 17, No. 3, 1989, pp. 294–322.
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© 1990 Congress of the United States, Office of Technology Assessment
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Congress of the United States Office of Technology Assessment. (1990). The Intellectual Property Bargain and Software. In: Computer Software & Intellectual Property. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12443-5_3
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12443-5_3
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