Abstract
Fear expressed by Americans at the end of World War I that British naval dominance would preclude the effective enforcement of the League of Nations Covenant was somewhat wide of the mark. Article 16 of the Covenant, paragraph 1, indicated that sanctions against an offending state were to follow the American wartime model. Commercial and financial transactions were to be severed at source. The effectiveness of the system would depend upon its universality. Paragraph 2 of Article 16 made provision for the possible need for military forces, but this was not conceived at the time of the Ethiopian crisis in 1935 as being intended to oblige members of the League to observe a sanctions rule. The extent to which naval blockade is a strategy which requires belligerent action against unoffending ‘neutral’ states made it inappropriate for League purposes. American hostility to naval blockade also ensured that it would be avoided.
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Notes
Philip C. Jessup, op. cit., vol. iv, p. 93.
Donald S. Birn, The League of Nations Union, s.v., ‘The Manchurian Crisis’ and The Ethiopian Crisis’.
CAB 21/299, CID Advisory Committee on Trading and Blockade in Time of War, Possibilities of Exerting Economic Pressure on the Nationalist Government of South China, Feb. 1927.
George W. Baer, Test Case Italy, Ethiopia, and the League of Nations, pp. 7–9, 245, 287 and 302–3. See also George Martelli, Italy Against the World.
Jill Edwards, The British Government and the Spanish Civil War, 1936–1939, Ch. 4, s.v., ‘Naval Attitudes to the Spanish Civil War’.
James Cable, The Royal Navy & the Siege of Bilbao, pp. 8–14, 55–76, 87 and 91–8.
C. E. Harvey, ‘Politics and Pyrites during the Spanish Civil War’, Economic History Review, s2, vol. 31, pp. 89–104, 1978.
Jill Edwards, loc. cit.; S. W. Roskill, op. cit., ii, ch. 12; Peter Gretton, ‘The Nyon Conference – the naval aspects’, English Historical Review, no. 354 (1975), p. 103; and (unattributed) The Nyon Arrangements – Piracy by Treaty?’, British Yearbook of International Law, 1938, p. 198.
Quoted in Jill Edwards, op. cit., p. 129.
Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War, pp. 859–65.
Jeffrey J. Safford, Wilsonian Maritime Diplomacy1913–1921, pp. 127–40.
Malcolm H. Murfett, ‘Are We Ready? The Development of American and British Naval Strategy, 1922–39’, in John B. Hattendorf and Robert S. Jordan, Maritime Strategy and the Balance of Power, pp. 220–1.
J. M. Haight, ‘Franklin D. Roosevelt and a naval quaranteen of Japan’, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 40, pp. 203–56, May 1971.
J. H. Herzog, ‘Influence of the United States Navy in the Embargo of Oil to Japan 1940–1941’, Pacific Historical Review, vol. 35, pp. 317–28, Aug. 1966.
Norman A. Graeber, ‘Japan, Unanswered Challenge, 1931–41’, in M. F. Morris and S. L. Myres (eds), Essays on American Foreign Policy.
See Walter R. Thomas, ‘Pacific Blockade: A Lost Opportunity of the 1930’s?’, United States Naval War College International Law Studies, p. 197.
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© 1991 John Nicholas Tracy
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Tracy, N. (1991). Trade Control and Blockade Between the Wars. In: Attack on Maritime Trade. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12303-2_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12303-2_5
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