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The Future of the Global Strategic Balance

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Reducing Nuclear Arsenals
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Abstract

The global strategic relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, commonly referred to as the strategic balance, is fundamentally characterised by complexity, change and uncertainty. Change in the political dimension tends to be somewhat cyclical, with periods of detente and constructive dialogue interspersed with periods of tension, distrust and hostile rhetoric. With respect to the technological dimension, change has been continuous since 1945, albeit with variations in pace, direction, and net impact on strategic stability.

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Notes

  1. See Desmond Ball, ‘Technology and Geopolitics’, in Ciro E. Zoppo and Charles Zorgbibe (eds) On Geopolitics: Chemical and Nuclear (Dordrecht, 1985) pp. 171–99.

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© 1991 Unione Scienziati per il Disarmo Convegno Internatzionale

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Ball, D. (1991). The Future of the Global Strategic Balance. In: Schaerf, C., Carlton, D. (eds) Reducing Nuclear Arsenals. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-12180-9_5

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