The Roots of New Thinking in U.S.-Soviet Relations

Abstract

In U.S.-Soviet relations, the 1980s will have been the decade of Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Sergeievich Gorbachev, so it is well to start with them. In his meetings with President Reagan and other American leaders, Gorbachev generally makes a presentation on the current state of perestroika. He knows that they are interested, and he knows that their fix on the status and prospects of reform in the Soviet Union is an important ingredient in their own policy toward his country. He does not enjoy making these presentations, because putting one’s domestic affairs on the diplomatic table could imply that the other fellow has some legitimate say in what you do at home. And in this case the other fellow is the other superpower, the United States, the country all those expensive missiles are aimed at, the country whose own missiles are aimed at you, the country, as all Soviets were taught to believe for generations, that leads the “imperialist camp.” So Gorbachev makes these presentations because they are useful rather than because he enjoys them. Often he preempts questions, offers answers to questions the Americans have not yet asked. Taking notes, I thought to myself on such occasions that he must be volunteering these accounts before the Americans asked in order to avoid that uncomfortable implication that he was doing things at home to please them, and thereby impinging on Soviet sovereignty after seven decades of revolutionary effort by his party to secure it.