The House of Morgan in Financial Diplomacy, 1920–1930

  • Kathleen Burk


The decade of the 1920s was a decade of money, with questions about raising it, lending it and spending it occupying the forefront of politics. Finance was at the centre of the geopolitical stage because of the course and outcome of the First World War. First Europe had to be reconstructed, trade had to be financed and currencies had to be stabilised; and secondly, there were war debts owed by the victors to each other which had to be funded, and reparations to be paid by the losers to the winners. All of these goals required money. Money of a dependable sort — based on gold, that is — was only really obtainable on any scale from one place, and that was the United States. But the American government was absolutely not going to provide public money for these types of projects, be they ever so desirable. What the American government wanted was for private money to make itself available for such borrowings. The British government, too, saw many of the goals stated above as desirable and even vital, but even less than the US could it contemplate using public money. Like the US, it preferred to encourage private money to fund reconstruction, for example.


Federal Reserve Private Banker British Government Foreign Loan Foreign Lending 
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© B. J. C. McKercher 1991

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  • Kathleen Burk

There are no affiliations available

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