In his interesting account of the Persian oil crisis Louis treats the negative conclusion reached by the Cabinet in their meeting of 12 July as a decisive turning point.2 No doubt this was what Attlee intended, but the course of military movements and the evolution of military planning during the rest of July reflected little perception of any fundamental change in British policy. On the contrary it was then that Buccaneer almost came to the boil.
KeywordsSmoke Straw Egypt Defend Oilfield
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes and References
- 1.Captain C.G.T. Dean, The Loyal Regiment (North Lancashire) 1919–1953 (RHO Preston, 1955), pp. 289–90.Google Scholar
- 2.William Roger Louis, The British Empire in the Middle East 1945–1951 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 668.Google Scholar
- 19.Francis Williams, Twilight of Empire: Memoirs of Prime Minister Clement Attlee (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), p. 255.Google Scholar
- 29.Letter from Captain Oglesby; Cyril Ray, The Lancashire Fusiliers (London: Leo Cooper, 1971) and DEFE 4 45.Google Scholar
- 38.Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Correspondence between His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom and the Persian Government and Related Documents concerning the Oil Industry in Persia — February 1951 to September 1951 (London: HMSO, Cmd 8425). See also L.P. Elwell-Sutton, Persian Oil (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1955), pp. 194–5.Google Scholar
- 39.Bahman Nirumand, Iran: The New Imperialism in Action (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 49.Google Scholar
- 43.Farhad Diba, Mohammed Mossadegh — A Political Biography (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 125.Google Scholar