Abstract
In the previous chapter we raised the question of the relation of the law of karma to justice. Two issues—whether transfer of merit is possible and consistent with justice, and whether the law of karma is a juridical or moral law—remain outstanding. We shall take them up in this chapter, which is a continuation of chapter 9.
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Notes
‘It is at the point when rebirth in heaven was no longer a process that the individual could accomplish alone, that the idea of transfer (originally of food, but soon after of a combination of food and merit) must have been introduced. For the descendants gave their ancestors part of their own religious merit (including the merit of having performed the śrāddha!) along with the ball of seed-rice; this enabled the preta to move “up” out of limbo, to the mutual benefit of the preta (who could now get on with the task of rebirth) and the living descendant (who could no longer be haunted by the preta). Thus the śrāddha represents an exchange of food and merit flowing in both directions.’ Wendy D. O’Flaherty, ‘Karma and Rebirth in the Vedas and Purāṇas’, in Wendy D. O’Flaherty (ed.), Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 10–11.
‘On the one hand, throughout much of the Pāli canon there is a strong emphasis on the personal nature of kamma. One’s kamma is said to be his own. … On the other hand, a doctrine of transfer of merit—apparently a popular development traceable to the Brahmanic śrāddha rites—finds expression in several places in the canon.’ James P. McDermott, ‘Karma and Rebirth in Early Buddhism’, in O’Flaherty (ed.), Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, p. 191. For a defence of the thesis that transfer of merit is consistent with Theravāda Buddhism, see F.L. Woodward, ‘The Buddhist Doctrine of Reversible Merit’, The Buddhist Review 6 (1914), pp. 38–50.
Karl H. Potter, ‘The Karma Theory and Its Interpretation in Some Indian Philosophical Systems’, in O’Flaherty (ed.), Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions, p. 263. For contemporary illustrations, see also David Miller, ‘Karma, Rebirth and the Contemporary Guru’, in Ronald W. Neufeldt (ed.), Karma and Rebirth (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986), pp. 61–8.
Transfer of merit is likewise present in popular Theravāda Buddhism. For a discussion of its presence in a Thai text see Charles F. Keyes, ‘Merit-Transference in the Kammic Theory of Popular Theravāda Buddhism’, in Charles F. Keyes and E. Valentine Daniel (eds), Karma: An Anthropological Inquiry (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), pp. 275–84.
D.T. Suzuki, Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism (New York: Schocken Books, 1963), p. 206.
C.S. Lewis, ‘The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment’, in Walter Hooper (ed.), God in the Dock (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Pub., 1970), pp. 287–94.
Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1967), p. 55.
Eliot Deutsch, Advaita Vedānta (Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1973), p. 100.
It might be replied that this is not quite true, especially in Buddhism. The law of karma does not implement the moral law, it determines it. That is, there is no set of prior moral laws which determine right and wrong. Right and wrong are determined in terms of whether they bring about good and bad, and good and bad are understood in terms of liberation from and extension of suffering. ‘Whatever action, bodily, verbal or mental, leads to suffering for oneself, for others or for both, that action is bad. Whatever action, bodily, verbal or mental, does not lead to suffering for oneself, for others or for both, that action is good.’ Ambalatthikā-Rāhulovāda-sutta, quoted in David J. Kalupahana, Buddhist Philosophy: A Historical Analysis (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1976), p. 62.
The problem is that in Buddhism there is both relativism and absolutism. Insofar as the quality of the consequences determine the moral quality of the action, insofar as the consequences which count are those related to creating or ending suffering, and insofar as what counts as suffering depends upon the individual person, what counts as instances of right and wrong is relative to each individual. On the other hand, the very claim that the pleasure or suffering produced by the consequences determines the moral character of the act constitutes an appeal to a moral principle which is non-relativistic. Further, there are listings of the moral virtues, such as the Five Precepts—abstaining from killing, stealing, indulging in sensual pleasure, lying, and intoxication—which are presented as absolute or objective, rightful acts. See H. Saddhatissa, Buddhist Ethics: Essence of Buddhism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1970)
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© 1990 Bruce R. Reichenbach
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Reichenbach, B.R. (1990). Transfer of Merit and the Law as Juridical. In: The Law of Karma. Library of Philosophy and Religion. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11899-1_10
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