Abstract
Until 1935, the primary significance of the Mediterranean in Britain’s global strategy was that it provided the shortest route to the Empire in the Far East. The commitment to the Far East was not only intrinsic, but served also as a guarantee to defend the Australian and New Zealand Dominions against the Japanese menace. The Italian conquest of Abyssinia in 1935 shattered this strategic conception, raised the spectre of hostilities with Italy in the Mediterranean, or a land attack against Egypt. It also exposed Britain’s inability to defend the widely-scattered components of her colonial Empire.
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© 1992 Michael J. Cohen and Martin Kolinsky
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Cohen, M.J., Kolinsky, M. (1992). Conclusion. In: Britain and the Middle East in the 1930s. Studies in Military and Strategic History. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11880-9_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11880-9_13
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-0-333-53514-1
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-11880-9
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