Abstract
When the SDIO was established in March 1984 and given a charter to direct American strategic defence research, its initial efforts focused on investigating the long-term potential of advanced defensive technologies. A long-term focus was required in order to pursue President Reagan’s goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles.1 It was estimated that the SDI programme would cost $26 billion over five years and that it might lead to a deployment decision in the early 1990s. Starting in 1987, however, the SDI programme underwent a noticeable shift away from long-term research and toward an emphasis on early deployment. Central to this shift was the notion that deployment of strategic defences would take place in phases.
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Notes and References
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 1985), pp. 3–5.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, April 1987), pp. 11.10- 11.11. The rationale for phased deployment was detailed in greater depth in a Pentagon Report on SDI’s deployment schedule. See US Department of Defense, A Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative Deployment Schedule (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 12 May 1987).
Cf. Douglas C. Waller and James T. Bruce, SDI: Progress and Challenges, Part Two (Staff Report Submitted to Senators William Proxmire and J. Bennett Johnston, 19 March 1987);
Janne E. Nolan, Guardians of the Arsenal: The Politics of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Basic Books, 1989), pp. 216ff.
Cited in R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Offensive Taken for Partial SDI Deployment’, Washington Post, 18 January 1987, p. A13.
John Walcott and Tim Carrington, ‘Missile Fight: Reagan’s Arms Policies are Damaged by Acts of His Warring Aides’, Wall Street Journal, 12 February 1987;
Gregory Fossedal, ‘NSC Minutes Show President is Leaning to SDI Deployment’, Washington Times, 6 February 1987, p. 1;
David C. Morrison, ‘Carlucci Had Key Role in Defusing State-Defense Flap over “Star Wars’”, National Journal, 28 February 1987, pp. 470–1.
Fred S. Hoffman (study director), Ballistic Missile Defenses and US National Security, Report prepared for the Future Strategy Security Study (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, October 1983), p. 7.
R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Pentagon Scales Back SDI Goals’, Washington Post, 27 March 1988, p. Al.
Lieutenant General George L. Monahan, ‘Strategic Defense Initiative FY91 Program Briefing’, (Washington, D.C.: SDIO, 9 February 1990), p. 6.
See statement of Robert Costello in US Congress, Senate, Restructuring the Strategic Defense Initiative [SDI] Program, Hearing before the Senate and House Committees on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 6 October 1988, pp. 16–17.
See testimony of General Robert Herres in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6: Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 1 March 1988, pp. 54–55.
See the Pentagon announcement of 18 September 1987, reprinted in EIR Science and Technology, 23 October 1987, pp. 26–33.
See SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense System Architecture (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, January 1988).
See US Congress, Senate, Restructuring the SDI Program, pp. 11–37.
Aspen Strategy Group, The Strategic Defense Initiative and American Security (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987);
Brent Scowcroft and R. James Woolsey, ‘Defense and Arms Control’, in Gerald Ford and James Carter (eds), American Agenda: Report to the Forty-First President of the United States (Washington, D.C.: American Agenda, 1988), p. 5.
Once in office, Scowcroft also appointed as NSC Director for Arms Control a RAND analyst, Arnold Kanter, who shared Scowcroft’s scepticism of SDI. See Arnold Kanter, Whither SDI? Strategic Defenses in the Next Administration (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, N-2806-RC, September 1988).
See statement of Paul D. Wolfowitz in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1990–91: Part 6, Strategic Forces and Nuclear Deterrence, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 15 June 1989, pp. 489ff. See also Michael R. Gordon, ‘Aides Say Bush Nears a Decision On Course of “Star Wars” Program’, New York Times, 19 April 1989;
Warren Strobel, ‘Cheney Urges Bush to Pursue Reagan’s Goals with SDI’, Washington Times, 20 April 1989, p. 3;
Warren Strobel, ‘Administration Protective about its Defense Plans’, Washington Times, 1 May 1989, p. 3;
Fred Barnes, ‘Danny Gets His Gun’, The New Republic, 26 June 1989, p. 10.
See R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘No Shift on Missile Defense Foreseen’, Washington Post, 9 June 1989, p. A20;
Michael R. Gordon, ‘Bush Resists Pressure to Soften Antimissile Policy’, New York Times, 9 June 1989, p. A3.
This position was not really changed by the Soviet announcement in September 1989 that it would be willing to sign a START agreement before a treaty on defence and space weapons had been agreed to, because it continued to insist that Soviet compliance with offensive force reductions was predicated on the non-deployment of defences. See Michael R. Gordon, ‘An Arms Obstacle Falls’, New York Times, 24 September 1989, pp. 1, 16;
R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Debates Erupt Over Soviet Arms Control Proposals’, Washington Post, 1 October 1989, pp. A10–A11.
The only constraint would be that deployment could take place only after both sides had engaged in three years of bilateral consultations on the implications of defences for strategic stability. After this period, either side would be allowed to deploy defences upon giving six months’ notice. See US ACDA, ‘Nuclear and Space Talks: US and Soviet Proposals’, Issues Brief, 22 January 1990, p. 3. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘US Rejects Space-Weapons Constraints’, Washington Post, 9 December 1989, p. A22;
Warren Strobel, ‘US Rejects Proposed Limits on SDI Experiments’, Washington Times, 5 December 1989, p. 7.
See Matthew Bunn and Lee Feinstein, ‘Baker and Shevardnadze Clear START Roadblocks’, Arms Control Today, 20, 2 (1990), p. 21.
See Michael R. Gordon, ‘Bush Plans to Cut Reagan Request for Key Weapons’, New York Times, 24 April 1989, pp. Al, A13;
Andrew Rosenthal, ‘“Star Wars” Plan Facing a Delay, Its Director Says’, New York Times, 12 May 1989, pp. Al, A32.
See General Monahan, ‘Strategic Defense Initiative FY91 Program Briefing’, p. 6.
See R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Year of Lobbying Turned “Brilliant Pebbles” Into Top SDI Plan’, Washington Post, 26 April 1989, p. A16.
Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, ‘“End of Tour” Report’ (Washington, D.C.: Memorandum for the Deputy Secretary of Defense, 9 February 1989).
Dan Quayle, ‘Speech to the Navy League of the United States’ (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Vice-President, 23 March 1989), p. 6.
See SDIO, ‘Strategic Defense System Space-Based Architecture Fact Paper’ (Washington, D.C.: SDIO, 9 February 1990).
Cf. Bob Davis, ‘Latest Star Wars Strategy to Gather Momentum Would Sprinkle “Brilliant Pebbles” in the Heavens’, Wall Street Journal, 22 May 1989, p. 16.
For details, see SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, April 1988), Ch. 5; SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense System Architecture, pp. 4–17; Statement of Lieutenant General George L. Monahan in US Congress, House National Defense Authorization Act for FY1990: Research, Development, Test and Evaluation, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 14 March 1989, pp. 521–84; prepared statement of Lieutenant General George L. Monahan before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 1990;
US Congress, OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability and Software, OTA-ISC-353 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, May 1988), pp. 8–16 and Chs 4 and 5.
Prepared statement of General Monahan before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 1990, pp. 5–6;
Peter Adams, ‘Brilliant Pebbles Raises Doubts to Value of BSTS Satellite System’, Defense News, 9 April 1990, p. 22.
Testimony of General Monahan in US Congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act for FY1990, p. 514.
The total number of interceptors for Phase-1 deployment is derived from statements that the initial architecture envisaged deployment of 1000 ERIS and that the restructuring of the architecture in October 1988 led to a 70 per cent increase in the number of GBIs. See testimony of General Abrahamson in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6, p. 77; and testimony of Costello in US Congress, Senate, Restructuring the SDI Program, p. 17. See also Pat Towell, ‘Political Struggle Over SDI Set to Enter New Phase’, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 1 April 1989, p. 703.
See SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, March 1989), pp. V.3.3–V.3.4; SDIO, ‘Strategic Defense System Space-Based Architecture Fact Paper’, pp. 2–5; and prepared statement of General Monahan before the Research and Development Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 1990. See also Lowell Wood, ‘“Brilliant Pebbles” Missile Defense Concept Advocated by Livermore Scientist’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 June 1988, pp. 151–2;
Theresa Foley, ‘Brilliant Pebbles Testing Proceeds at Rapid Pace’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 14 November 1988, pp. 32–3;
William Broad, ‘What’s Next for “Star Wars”? “Brilliant Pebbles”’, New York Times, 25 April 1989, pp. C1–C2.
Transcript of SDIO briefing by Lieutenant General George L. Monahan and Lowell Wood (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 9 February 1990), p. 17.1.
US Department of Defense, A Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative Deployment Schedule, p. 3.
See testimony of General Abrahamson in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations, FY1988: Part 2, Hearings before the Committee on Appropriations, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 19 March 1987, p. 200.
See testimony of General Abrahamson in Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6, p. 725. However, General Monahan has noted that this schedule could slip by two years as a result of the reduced funding levels requested by the Bush Administration. See Andrew Rosenthal, ‘“Star Wars” Plan Facing a Delay, Its Director Says’, New York Times, 21 May 1989, p. Al. Congressionally imposed cuts of over $1 billion in FY1990 funding are bound to lead to a further slippage in the deployment schedule.
Caspar Weinberger, ‘It’s Time to Get SDI Off the Ground’, New York Times, 21 August 1987.
Richard Cheney, ‘The Importance of Strategic Modernization’, remarks delivered before the Veterans of Foreign Wars National Convention, Las Vegas, 23 August 1989, reprinted in Defense Issues, 4, 26 (1989), p. 4.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense System Architecture, p. 5.
‘Letter by Secretary Frank Carlucci to Congressman Les Aspin’, 20 September 1988, p. 5.
‘Letter by Secretary Carlucci to Congressman Aspin’, p. 5, emphasis added. See also the letter by Air Force Chief of Staff General Larry Welch to Senator Strom Thurmond in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6, p. 685; and General John Piotrowski, ‘Missile Defense Not a Fantasy’, Defense News, 13 November 1989, p. 28.
Answer for the record by General Herres in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1990–91: Part 6, p. 579.
See especially the testimonies of Generals Herres, Chain and Abrahamson in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6, pp. 54–7, 85–8, 136–7, 684–5 and 692.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1990–91: Part 6, p. 517. Notwithstanding the likelihood of a START agreement, the assumption of an unconstrained Soviet threat is realistic given Moscow’s repeated statements that it will only reduce its offensive forces as long as the United States does not deploy defences. This assumption therefore also forms the basis of our evaluation of Phase-1 deployment.
The size of the Soviet missile threat in 1996 was revealed in a sanitized Senate staff report, which noted that the ‘START agreement now being negotiated would reduce the [deleted] Soviet ballistic missile threat by 65%-69%’. In a different section of this report, the deleted date in this sentence is given as 1996. See James T. Bruce, Bruce W. MacDonald and Ronald Tammen, Star Wars at the Crossroads (Washington, D.C.: Staff Report to Senators Bennett Johnston, Dale Bumpers and William Proxmire, 12 June 1988), pp. 2 and 23. Since START would reduce ballistic missile warheads to 4900, the 1996 Soviet ballistic missile warhead threat would be between 14000 and 16000. The 16000 number corresponds to a June 1985 CIA estimate of the number of warheads the Soviet Union could deploy by the mid-1990s if no further arms control agreements were signed. See Robert M. Gates and Lawrence K. Gershwin, ‘Soviet Strategic Force Developments’, Testimony before a joint session of the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater Nuclear Forces of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 26 June 1985, p. 4. Jeffrey Smith reported that the JCS assumed that the leading edge would consist of 5000 warheads. See Smith, ‘Pentagon Scales Back SDI Goals’, p. Al. Congressman Norman Dicks has said that the JCS assumed that the attack would consist of 4700 RVs. See Paul Mann, ‘Confidential SDI Data Show Push for Near-Term Weapons’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 March 1988, p. 16. The 4700 figure is also reported in Towell, ‘Political Struggle Over SDI Set to Enter New Phase’, p. 703.
Richard Cheney, ‘Address to the National Press Club’, Washington D.C., 22 March 1990, C-SPAN transcript, pp. 23–4. The quoted sentence is reprinted in Arms Control Reporter, 1990, p. 575.E.6. Before Secretary Cheney’s speech, press reports, which were confirmed by the then Secretary of Defense, Frank Carlucci, indicated that the JCS requirement stated that 30 rather than 40 per cent of the attacking Soviet warheads would have to be intercepted (see Stewart Powell and John Wallach, “‘Star Wars” Downplayed by Carlucci’, Seattle-Post Intelligence, 21 December 1988, p. 1). See also Mann, ‘Confidential SDI Data Show Push for Near-Term Weapons’, p. 16; Smith, ‘Pentagon Scales Back SDI Goals’, p. Al; and Towell, ‘Political Struggle Over SDI Set to Enter New Phase’, p. 703. However, as Matthew Bunn has shown, the confusion is due to the fact that the 30 per cent figure refers to the percentage of non-SS-18 warheads that the defence must intercept, not to the overall percentage. See Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1990), p. 195.
US Congress, Senate, Restructuring the SDI Program, p. 18, emphasis in original.
Cited in Peter Grier, ‘How “Star Wars” Came in From the Political Cold’, Christian Science Monitor (international edn), 23–29 November 1987, p. 11.
‘Quayle Lobbies Hard for B-2, SDI’, Defense Week, 31 July 1989, p. 7. See also the study by Frank Gaffney and others, as reported in David J. Lynch, ‘Defenses Seen Giving US Strategic, Economic Edge’, Defense Week, 24 October 1988, p. 1.
See John D. Steinbruner and Thomas M. Garwin, ‘Strategic Vulnerability: The Balance Between Prudence and Paranoia’, International Security, 1, 1 (1976);
Stanley Sienkiewicz, ‘Observations on the Impact of Uncertainty in Strategic Analysis’, reprinted in John F. Reichart and Steven R. Sturm (eds), American Defense Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982);
Matthew Bunn and Kosta Tsipis, ‘The Uncertainties of a Pre-emptive Nuclear Attack’, Scientific American, 255, 6 (November 1983).
See also Steven E. Miller, ‘Arms Control and Strategic Defense: The Uncertain Connection’, in Alvin M. Weinberg and Jack N. Barkenbus (eds), Strategic Defenses and Arms Control (New York: Paragon House, 1988), pp. 217–18;
Charles Glaser, ‘Do We Want the Missile Defenses We Can Build?’, in Steven E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera (eds), The ‘Star Wars’ Controversy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 108–10.
Others who share this view include Hoffman, Ballistic Missile Defense and US National Security, p. 2; and Colin S. Gray, ‘A New Debate on Ballistic Missile Defense’, Survival, 23, 2 (1981), p. 68.
See also testimony of Harold Brown in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1988/89, Part 4, p. 2645.
Miller, ‘Arms Control and Strategic Defense’, pp. 214–15.
See SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (April 1987), p. 11.11.
Hoffman, Ballistic Missile Defense and US National Security, p. 9.
Cf. Ashton B. Carter, ‘BMD Applications: Performance and Limitations’, in Ashton B. Carter and David N. Schwartz (eds), Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1984), pp. 109ff.
Joseph Cirincione (staff director), Strategic Defense, Strategic Choices (Washington, D.C.: Staff Report on the Strategic Defense Initiative for the Democratic Caucus of the US House of Representatives, May 1988), p. 25.
See answer for the record by General Herres in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6, p. 101. According to General Herres, it was only in mid-1989, two years after the JCS developed the Phase-1 requirement, that it began to analyse the implications of two-sided defence deployments, the first results of which would not be available until late 1989. General Herres also noted that not only the JCS but the entire strategic defence analytical community had failed to conduct an analysis of two-sided defence deployments until the JCS began its study in 1989. See US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1990 and 1990: Part 6, pp. 576–7.
See the discussion of this issue in Chapter 3, pp. 57–9, above.
Scott Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 122, emphasis in original.
One exception is a report issued by SDIO in April 1988 which did discuss the implications of Soviet defensive deployments in conjunction with US defences. See SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative, pp. G.6-G.7. However, this discussion focused on a situation in which both sides had deployed highly capable defences. Under these conditions stability could be enhanced, because the strategic environment would then be characterized by a situation in which both sides possessecK only second strike forces consisting of bombers and cruise missiles, which would be ill-suited either for pre-emption or being pre-empted. Neither SDIO nor any other US government agency has issued a public report on the implications for stability of US and Soviet defence deployments of limited effectiveness, however.
See also Paul Stockton, Strategic Stability between the Super-powers, Adelphi Paper No. 213 (London: IISS, 1986), pp. 49–52.
See OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, p. 27.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (March 1989), p. 1.4.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense System Architecture, p. 3.
This is also the formal position of the Bush Administration. General Monahan has testified that in the next three to four years no tests are contemplated which would call the ABM Treaty into question. See Andrew Rosenthal, ‘Pentagon: The New “Star Wars” Chief Brings a Soft-sell Approach to his Mission’, New York Times, 18 May 1989, p. B6.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, p. 226.
Matthew Bunn, ‘Star Wars Testing and the ABM Treaty’, Arms Control Today, 18, 3 (April 1988), p. 17.
US Congress, House, Special Panel on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Hearings before the Strategic Defense Initiative Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 2nd Session 29 April 1988, p. 344. See also John E. Pike and Barry E, Fridling, ‘Limits on Antimissile Sensor Systems’, in Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty (eds), Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989), p. 169.
Richard L. Garwin and Theodore Jarvis, ‘Non-ABM Technologies with ABM Potential’, in Chayes and Doty (eds), Defending Deterrence, p. 109, note 13.
See Garwin and Jarvis, ‘Non-ABM Technologies with ABM Potential’, p. 100; Thomas H. Johnson, ‘Ground-Based ABM Systems’, in Chayes and Doty (eds), Defending Deterrence, pp. 125–8; and Ashton B. Carter, ‘The Structure of Possible US-Soviet Agreements Regarding Missile Defense’, in Joseph S. Nye, Jr, and James A. Schear (eds), On the Defensive? The Future of SDI (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 146–7.
On US concerns about SAM upgrades, see Ivo H. Daalder and Jeffrey Boutwell, ‘TBMs and ATBMs: Arms Control Considerations’, in Donald Hafner and John Roper (eds), ATBMs and Western Security (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), pp. 180–3; and Carter, ‘The Structure of Possible US-Soviet Agreements’, pp. 147–8.
US Congress, House, Special Panel on the SDI, p. 344. See also Pike and Fridling, ‘Limits on Antimissile Sensor Systems’, p. 170.
See Ashton B. Carter, ‘Testing Weapons in Space’, Scientific American, 261, 1 (June 1989), p. 35; and Bunn, ‘Star Wars Testing and the ABM Treaty’, p. 15.
Bunn, Foundation for the Future, p. 97.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (April 1987), p. Dll. See also Bunn, Foundation for the Future, p, 97.
Under the reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty the development and testing of ABM components that are based on ‘other physical principles’ would be allowed. While the development and testing of fixed, land-based ABM components based on other physical principles is allowed under all interpretations of the Treaty, the Reagan and Bush Administrations maintain that this also applies to mobile land-, sea-, air-and space-based components whose development, testing and deployment is explicitly prohibited under Article V. See Abram Sofaer, The ABM Treaty (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State, 11 May 1987).
Although neither the Reagan nor the Bush Administration has adopted a formal definition of the meaning of other physical principles, the US Defense Department has argued that space-based interceptors like BP could be considered to be based on other physical principles. See US Department of Defense, A Report to the Congress on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, 21 September 1987), p. 3, note 1. However, this is a misreading of the ABM Treaty. Agreed Statement (D) of the Treaty clearly states that ABM components are only based on other physical principles if they are ‘capable of acting as substitutes for an ABM interceptor missile’. A ‘brilliant pebble’, as an interceptor, would not substitute for an ABM interceptor missile as, say, a laser would. Moreover, the US has also agreed that rockets with ‘the capability to carry out an interception without being guided by an ABM radar’, such as BP, are still considered to be an ‘ABM interceptor’ and cannot therefore be based on other physical principles. See prepared statement of Richard P. Godwin, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1988–89: Part 4, p. 2492. See also Bunn, Foundation for the Future, pp. 70–1; and Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision — A Memoir (New York: Grove Weidenfeld, 1989), pp. 468ff.
See ACDA, ‘Nuclear and Space Talks’, p. 3.
US Department of Defense, A Report to the Congress on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, p. vi.
Prepared statement of General Monahan before the Subcommittee on Research and Development of the House Armed Services Committee, 4 April 1990, p. 4; and SDIO, ‘Strategic Defense System Space-Based Architecture Fact Paper’, pp. 3–4.
Defense Science Board, Report on SDIO Brilliant Pebbles Space Based Interceptor Concept (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, December 1989), pp. 3–4.
See R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Board Responded to a Narrow Question’, Washington Post, 18 February 1990, p. A18.
See, for example, SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (March 1989), pp. V.3.1ff.
Cited in Matthew Bunn, ‘Pentagon Science Advisers’ Report Critical of “Brilliant Pebbles’”, Arms Control Today, 19, 9 (1989), p. 31. See also the comments quoted in Smith, ‘Board Responded to a Narrow Question’, p. A18.
Robert R. Everett (chairman), Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force Subgroup on Strategic Air Defense — Strategic Defense Milestone Panel (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 1987), p. 4.
Cited in Cirincione, Strategic Defense, Strategic Choices, p. 23.
Cited in ‘BM/C3 Researchers Scramble to Add Brilliant Pebbles’, SDI Monitor, 30 March 1990, p. 83.
OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, pp. 249–50. See also testimony of Peter Sharfman in US Congress, House, Special Panel on the SDI, p. 300.
See John Markoff, ‘Breakdown’s Lesson: Failure Occurs on Superhuman Scale’, New York Times, 17 January 1990, p. B7.
Lowell Wood, ‘“Brilliant Pebbles” Missile Defense Concept Advocated by Livermore Scientist’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 June 1987, p. 153.
See Theresa M. Foley, ‘Sharp Rise in Brilliant Pebbles Interceptor Funding Accompanied by New Questions About Technical Feasibility’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 May 1989, pp. 20–1.
Jonathan Jacky, Throwing Stones at “Brilliant Pebbles’”, Technology Review, October 1989, p. 21.
For a detailed description of this defensive approach, see OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, pp. 9–11.
On potential countermeasures, see Matthew Bunn, ‘SDI Won’t Do the Job Even if it Meets the Requirement’ (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, September 1988), pp. 14–15.
Assuming that all attacking Soviet warheads have a PK of 0.8 and that the defence will intercept 40 per cent of the attacking RVs, then the probability of survival (Ps) is given by: Ps = M[1— (1 — PKdef) (PKrv)]N, where M equals the number of silos defended, PKdef is the PK of the defence, PKrv is the PK of the attacking warheads and N is the number of warheads attacking each silo.
For a detailed description of how to calculate the effectiveness of a Phase-1 system which employs a strategy of adaptive preferential defence, see Bunn, ‘SDI Won’t Do the Job Even if it Meets the Requirement’, pp. 6ff.
This result is arrived at as follows: 1,700 GBI with an effectiveness of 80 per cent each would intercept 1360 RVs (1700 x 0.8 = 1360). Since the entire system would be able to intercept 2000 RVs, the space-based layer would intercept 640 RVs (2000 — 1360 = 640), which is almost 13 per cent of the 5000 RVs the Soviet Union is assumed to use in its attack.
However, unlike a ground-based defensive architecture containing a terminal intercept layer, a Phase-1 system would be totally ineffective in defending high value targets such as strategic bomber bases and C3 facilities against a depressed-trajectory SLBM attack, because these missiles would underfly both boost and mid-course defences.
Cited in ‘SDI Budget Cutbacks to Delay Near-Term Weapons Deployment’, Aviation Week & Space Technology, 22 May 1989, p. 22. See also the comments of Senator Sam Nunn in US Congress, Senate, Restructuring the SDI Program, pp. 39–40.
Christopher T. Cunningham, The Space-Based Interceptor (Berkeley, CA: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, October 1988), p. 7.
OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, p. 15.
OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, p. 16. See also US Congress, OTA, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures and Arms Control, OTA-ISC-28 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, September 19875), esp. Ch. 4;
Ashton B. Carter, ‘Satellites and Anti-Satellites: The Limits of the Possible’, International Security, 10, 4 (1986), p. 75.
See, for example, John Gardner et al., Missile Defense in the 1990s, Report of the Technical Panel (Washington, D.C.: George C. Marshall Institute, 1987), pp. 17–29; Cunningham, The Space-Based Interceptor, pp. 20–2; and OTA, Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures and Arms Control, pp. 76–86.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, pp. 215–20.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, pp. 66–7.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, p. 376.
Jacky, ‘Throwing Stones at “Brilliant Pebbles’”, p. 21. See also Bunn, Foundation for the Future, p. 33.
OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, p. 4.
Lowell Wood, ‘“Brilliant Pebbles” Missile Defense Concept,’ p. 152.
See also the analysis in OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, pp. 117–18.
Everett, Report of the Defense Science Board I Strategic Defense Milestone Panel (1987), p. 2.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (April 1988), p. IV. 1.8, emphasis added.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense System Architecture, p. 21.
See also, Bunn, Foundation for the Future, p. 36.
While those who have analysed the impact of faster burning boosters on Phase-1 focus on SBI, as long as the fly-out velocity of BP is the same as that of SBI, the impact of deploying fast-burn boosters on BP would be identical. Hence, although the following discussion concentrates on examining the impact of these boosters on SBI, all conclusions apply with equal force to BP.
US Congress, House, Special Panel on the SDI, p. 299.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, pp. 392 and 387.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, pp. 233 and 232.
See Sanford Lakoff and Herbert York, A Shield in Space? Technology, Politics and the Strategic Defense Initiative (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989), p. 123.
See Lakoff and York, A Shield in Space?, p. 122.
Cunningham, The Space-Based Interceptor, p. 17.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, p. 201.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, p. 235.
Cf. Lakoff and York, A Shield in Space?, p. 124.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, p. 233.
See Peter Adams, ‘Abrahamson: Soviets Cannot Afford SDI Counter-measures’, Defense News, 28 April 1989, p. 4.
According to Secretary of Defense Cheney, the ‘most striking feature of Soviet military power today is the extraordinary momentum of its offensive strategic nuclear force modernization’. See US Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1989 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1989), preface.
US Congress, House, Special Panel on the SDI, p. 325, emphases omitted.
US Department of Defense, A Report to the Congress on the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, p. vii.
Bruce, MacDonald and Tammen, Star Wars at the Crossroads, p. 81.
US Congress, House, National Defense Authorization Act for FY1990, p. 525.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6, p. 69.
US Congress, Senate, Restructuring the SDI Program, p. 75.
See also testimony of Peter Sharfman in US Congress, House, Special Panel on the SDI, pp. 299–300.
The then-year dollar estimate for the October 1988 Phase-1 architecture was provided by General Monahan in testimony in US Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1990: Part 7, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 23 March 1983, p. 717. The then-year dollar estimate for the February 1990 architecture was arrived at by using the same inflator.
Unlike the October 1988 cost estimate, the February 1990 estimate included no reserve funds for unforeseen cost increases. Thus over $1 billion of the reduction in costs resulted from eliminating this reserve fund in the February 1990 cost estimate.
US Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1990: Part 7, pp. 717–18.
‘CAIG Review of Cost Estimates for Strategic Defense System, Phase I’, in US Congress, Senate, Restructuring the SDI Program, p. 65.
OTA, SDI: Technology, Survivability, and Software, p. 23.
‘Statement of Frank C. Conahan before the Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the House Committee on Government Operations’ (Washington, D.C.: US General Accounting Office, GAO/T-NSIAD-89–18, 21 March 1989), p. 8.
Lowell Wood, ‘“Brilliant Pebbles” Missile Defense Concept’, p. 152; Quayle, ‘Speech to the Navy League of the United States’, p. 6; and transcript of SDIO briefing by General Monahan and Lowell Wood, p. 17.1. Note that these estimates are for production costs only and exclude R&D and deployment expenses. If these are included, then the cost of a single pebble would be $3 million, or double SDIO’s most recent estimate. This cost is arrived at using SDIO data. Thus, according to SDIO, the acquisition cost of 4614 interceptors is $12 billion (see Table 4.3). SDIO also estimates BP launch cost at $2 billion; see transcript of SDIO briefing by General Monahan and Lowell Wood, p. 17.1.
When originally proposed by the US Air Force in the late-1970s, the AMRAAM was to cost about $100000 a copy. By 1989, the cost had escalated almost five-fold to $480000 or about the same as the Vice President’s estimate of the cost of a single ‘pebble’. However, as Bruce MacDonald has argued, AMRAAM’s mission is ‘trivially simple in comparison to Brilliant Pebbles’. MacDonald points out that AMRAAM need not acquire its target and will be guided for the first part of its flight by the aircraft that launched it. Its on-board computer is nothing like a ‘pebble’s’ Cray-1 and AMRAAM need not be as accurate because it has a high-explosive warhead whereas a ‘pebble’ must destroy its target through direct collision. Most importantly, MacDonald continues, ‘AMRAAM missiles can be maintained, checked and overhauled routinely, while Brilliant Pebbles must survive unattended in space for years’. See Bruce W. MacDonald, ‘Lost in Space: SDI Struggles Through Its Sixth Year’, Arms Control Today, 19, 7 (1989), p. 24.
The views of the JCS are reported in Michael Gordon, ‘Aides Say Bush Nears a Decision On Course of “Star Wars” Program’. See also the interview with former JCS Chairman Admiral William Crowe in R. Jeffrey Smith, ‘Joint Chiefs’ Enthusiasm on the Wane from the Start’, Washington Post, 18 February 1990, p. A18.
US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1989, Part 6, pp. 126–8, 137.
See, for example, testimony of George Miller in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, p. 400; and testimony of Robert L. Sproull, member of the SDIO Scientific Advisory Panel, in US Congress, House, SDI Program, Hearings before the Defense Policy Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 1st Session, 8 July 1987, p. 180.
‘SDI Information Paper’, reprinted in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Authorization for Appropriations for FY1990–91: Part 6, p. 571.
General Monahan, ‘Strategic Defense Initiative FY1991 Program Briefing’, p. 6.
See Vincent Kiernan, ‘Generals Disagree Over SDI Development Plan Shift’, Space News, 11 December 1989, p. 3.
Cited in George C. Wilson, ‘SDI Was “Oversold”, Cheney Says’, Washington Post, 29 March 1989, p. A4.
US Congress, House, Special Panel on the SDI, p. 474.
With the exception of the Phase-1 system costs discussed earlier, all figures are derived from Table 3.4 and Table 3.5. The operation and support cost of deploying 500 single-warhead Midgetman missiles at Minuteman bases is $3.9 billion over 15 years, or $2.6 billion over ten years. See answer for the record by John J. Welch in US Congress, House, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1990: Part 7, Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 28 February 1989, p. 288. Assuming that deploying three times the number of missiles would increase annual O&S costs by three, then the 10-year O&S cost for 1500 single-warhead Midgetman deployed at Minuteman bases would be $7.8 billion, for a total 10-year life-cycle cost of $65.1 billion. As noted earlier, the 10-year operation and support cost of a Phase-1 system would be $35.2 billion, which means that the 10-year life-cycle cost would be $90.5 billion.
See, for example, testimony of Abrahamson in US Congress, Senate, Department of Defense Appropriations for FY1988, Part 2, p. 205.
Transcript of SDIO briefing by General Monahan and Lowell Wood, p. 20–1.
Cunningham’s analysis is based on cost and effectiveness assumptions of SBIs rather than BP. However, his cost estimate of SBI of $1.5 million per interceptor and his assumption that the interceptor has a fly-out speed of 6 km/sec can equally apply to BP. See Cunningham, The Space- Based Interceptor, pp. 22–8.
Cited in Cirincione, Strategic Defense, Strategic Choices, p. 20.
Conclusion: Strategic Defence Research in the 1990s
The editorial board of the Wall Street Journal has led this charge; see, for example, ‘“Red Shield” Rising’, Wall Street Journal, 15 March 1988, p. 34.
See David S. Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), esp. pp. 29–61; and NBC News Special, ‘A Conversation with Mikhail Gorbachev’, 30 November 1987.
But see also Matthew Bunn, Foundation for the Future: The ABM Treaty and National Security (Washington, D.C.: Arms Control Association, 1990), pp. 48–55;
Stephen Daggett and Robert D. English, ‘Assessing Soviet Strategic Defense’, Foreign Policy, 70 (Spring 1988), pp. 129–49.
See, for example, Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance, pp. 63ff.; Paul H. Nitze, ‘The Nuclear and Space Talks: The Reagan Legacy and Beyond’, Arms Control Today, 19, 1 (1989) p. 9;
William Perry, Brent Scowcroft, Joseph Nye and James Schear, ‘The Future of SDI: An Introduction’, in Joseph S. Nye, Jr, and James A. Schear (eds), On the Defensive? The Future of SDI (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), p. 7.
See Ronald Reagan, ‘The President’s Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements’ (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 10 March 1987), p. 4;
George Bush, ‘Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agree-merits’ (Washington, D.C.: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 23 February 1990), p. 17.
Angelo Codevilla, While Others Build: A Commonsense Approach to the Strategic Defense Initiative (New York: Free Press, 1988), pp. 123–6.
Jack Kemp, ‘How To Proceed with SDI — Deploy Now’, National Interest, 7 (Spring 1987), p. 79.
On the Soviet position in the Geneva negotiations, see IISS, ‘Arms Control’, in Strategic Survey, 1988–89 (London: IISS, 1989), pp. 46–7, On the radar issue, see ‘The Kremlin Apology: Excerpts From Speech’, New York Times, 25 October 1989, p. A6;
Don Oberdorfer and Ann Devroy, ‘Soviets Dismantle Disputed Radar’, Washington Post, 29 May 1990, pp. Al, A10. On the possibility of a zero-ABM amendment, see Robert C. Toth, ‘Soviets Quietly Offering a Deal on Defensive Arms’, Los Angeles Times, 12 October 1989, p. 11.
See also Stephen Meyer, ‘The Near-Term Impact of SDI on Soviet Strategic Programs: An Institutional Perspective’, in Nye and Schear, On the Defensive?, pp. 55–86.
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, April 1988), p. G-4.
See, for example, SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (April 1988), p. 1–5.
See Defense Science Board, Report on SDIO Brilliant Pebbles Space Based Interceptor Concept (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, December 1989), p. 5.
See also Perry et al., ‘The Future of SDI’, pp. 6–10; Harold Brown, ‘Is SDI Technically Feasible?’ Foreign Affairs, 64, 3 (1986) pp. 451–4;
Joseph Cirincione (staff director), Strategic Defense, Strategic Choices (Washington, D.C.: Staff Report on the Strategic Defense Initiative for the Democratic Caucus of the House of Representatives, May 1988), pp. 31–3;
Center for International Security and Arms Control, Strategic Missile Defense: Necessity, Prospects and Dangers in the Near-Term (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, April 1985).
SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (April 1988), p. G-5.
Robert C. Everett (chairman), Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force Subgroup on Strategic Air Defense (SDI Milestone Panel) (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, May 1988) p. 3.
See, for example, Bunn, Foundation for the Future, pp. 90–103.
See also prepared statement of Ashton B. Carter in US Congress, House, Special Panel on the Strategic Defense Initiative, Hearings before the Strategic Defense Initiative Panel of the Committee on Armed Services, 100th Congress, 2nd Session, 29 April 1988, pp. 341ff.; and Perry et al, ‘The Future of SDI’, p. 9.
See Senator Joseph Biden and John Ritch, ‘The End of the Sofaer Doctrine’, Arms Control Today, 18, 7, (1988).
See Nitze, ‘The Nuclear and Space Talks’, p. 10; Ashton B. Carter, ‘The Structure of Possible US-Soviet Agreements Regarding Missile Defenses’, in Nye and Schear (eds), On the Defensive?; Ashton B. Carter, ‘Limitations and Allowances for Space-Based Weapons’, and Albert Carnesale, ‘Managing the ABM Treaty Regime: Issues and Options’, both in Antonia Handler Chayes and Paul Doty (eds), Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into the 21st Century (Washington D.C.: Pergamon-Brassey’s, 1989); and Bunn, Foundation for the Future, pp. 142–59.
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© 1991 International Institute for Strategic Studies
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Daalder, I.H. (1991). A Phase-1 Strategic Defence System. In: Strategic Defences in the 1990s. Studies in International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11792-5_5
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