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Deployment Criteria for Strategic Defences

  • Ivo H. Daalder
Part of the Studies in International Security book series (SIS)

Abstract

In February 1985, Paul Nitze, the Reagan Administration’s most prominent arms-control expert, announced that the United States would not deploy a strategic defence system unless it met three criteria. The ‘Nitze criteria’, as they were subsequently called, stipulated that defences would have to be militarily effective, survivble and cost-effective at the margin to warrant deployment.1 Once put forward publicly the criteria acquired, according to Strobe Talbott, ‘the status of holy writ within much of the Administration’.2 They were incorporated in an Administration National Security Directive, which set out the basic rationale for SDI, and they were also included in legislation authorizing funds for strategic defence research.3 Since 1986, moreover, the SDIO and the US Department of Defense have both repeatedly stressed that a deployment decision will depend on a defence system meeting all three of these criteria.4 The Nitze criteria have therefore become the generally accepted basis for decisions regarding strategic defence deployment.

Keywords

Ballistic Missile Defensive System Military Target Strategic Stability Strategic Bomber 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes and References

  1. 1.
    Paul H. Nitze, ‘On the Road to a More Stable Peace’, address to the Philadelphia World Affairs Council, 20 February 1985, reprinted in Samuel F. Wells and Robert S. Litwak (eds), Strategic Defenses and Soviet-American Relations (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1987), pp. 193–9. As Nitze himself has noted, other Administration officials had mentioned the three criteria before Nitze made his speech. See, for example, testimony of Frank Miller in US Congress, House, Arms Control in Outer Space, Hearings before the Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs, Committee on Foreign Affairs, 98th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, 36 July 1984, p. 214; and The President’s Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: The White House, January 1985), p. 5.Google Scholar
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  3. 2.
    Strobe Talbott, The Master of the Game (New York: Vintage Books, 1988), p. 218. j.Google Scholar
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    See, for example, SDIO, Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Initiative (Washington, D.C.: US Department of Defense, April 1987), pp. IV.2–IV.3;Google Scholar
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  8. 5.
    See, for example, The President’s Strategic Defense Initiative, p. 5.Google Scholar
  9. 6.
    One of the few attempts to develop specific criteria which should govern both the R&D phase and possible deployment options was by the Office of Technology Assessment. US Congress, OTA, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies, OTA-ISC-254 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office), pp. 12–31.Google Scholar
  10. 7.
    In addition to retaliatory considerations, US strategic force planning has also been influenced (some would say determined) by the requirements to extend deterrence to Allies. Under certain conditions, extended deterrence requirements could entail the need to employ strategic forces first, leading to targeting objectives that might differ from those required for the purpose of retaliation. Rather than including this complicating factor in the discussion below, the focus here will be on retaliatory requirements only. For a detailed discussion of the impact of strategic defences on extended deterrence, see Ivo H. Daalder, NATO Strategy and Ballistic Missile Defence, Adelphi Paper No. 233 (London: IISS, 1988).Google Scholar
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    The following example illustrates the point. Assume that the United States has deployed 1500 single-warhead ICBMs and another 3500 RVs on invulnerable SLBMs. Assume also that in the absence of defences, a Soviet first strike of 3000 ICBM RVs against the 1500 US ICBMs would destroy all ICBMs. Because the USSR would have no defences, the US could retaliate with its 3500 SLBM RVs, almost all of which would reach Soviet soil. Now assume that both the US and the USSR deploy defences capable of intercepting 3000 RVs each. A Soviet attack on US ICBMs, using 3000 warheads, would fail to destroy any ICBMs, leaving the US with all its warheads for retaliation. Of the 5000 RVs attacking the Soviet Union, however, 3000 would be intercepted by the Soviet defensive system and only 2000 would penetrate to their targets.Google Scholar
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    This requirement was recognized by Paul Nitze. See Nitze, ‘On the Road to a More Stable Peace’, p. 195.Google Scholar
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© International Institute for Strategic Studies 1991

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  • Ivo H. Daalder

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