Abstract
Up to ten years ago, industrial economics in the Anglo-Saxon tradition was a heavily ‘empirical’ subject. Following the tradition laid down by Bain and his successors, industrial economists focused particular attention on the investigation of a small number of statistical regularities, which were usually investigated by means of cross-sectional regressions carried out across a group of independent industries.
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© 1992 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited
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Sutton, J. (1992). Implementing Game-Theoretic Models in Industrial Economics: Levels of Attack. In: Del Monte, A. (eds) Recent Developments in the Theory of Industrial Organization. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11771-0_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11771-0_2
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