Abstract
Part I of this book began with a definitional discussion focussing on distinguishing terrorism from other forms of conflict. Having then classified both the RAF and the PIRA as terrorist, it went on to portray the historical and ideological influences on both groups. Chapter 2 introduced some international factors which facilitated the emergence of not only the RAF and the PIRA, but a whole range of terrorist groups operating within the Western democracies. But many of these groups have long since disappeared, like the Angry Brigade in England, or the Symbionese Liberation Army in the United States. So clearly internal factors must be of at least equal importance in explaining why both groups survived, and why they have had such a great impact on their respective societies. In Germany it is the historical experiences of Nazism, and particularly Germany’s position in Cold War politics, that explain why the RAF assumes a great importance. History explains much about the PIRA too.
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Notes and References
Numbers required to survive probably differ vastly from numbers needed for victory. There is little empirical evidence for the latter, but the RAF has survived with, perhaps, as few as ten active volunteers.
Another example of this is the SAS shooting of three PIRA members in Gibraltar in March 1988. Regardless of the controversies surrounding this event, and the propaganda the PIRA will generate, it was an ill-conceived act. Intelligence plays the key role in practically countering terrorism, and gathering intelligence from three dead bodies is beyond the capabilities of even the SAS.
The ‘Yellow Card’ containing instructions for security forces operating in Northern Ireland, for example, is a restricted document.
In this sense the RUC’s decision in March 1988 not to police PIRA funerals in return for a promise from families and the church that there would be no paramilitary displays, was a courageous one. Many of those who attend PIRA funerals are there in the hope of direct confrontation with the RUC, rather than from any great wish to pay respects to the ‘fallen’ volunteer. Many news crews are there for the same reason. However, the RUC’s decision was portrayed to the Loyalists as capitulation to the PIRA, and a Loyalist engaged in a barbaric attack on the mourners at the funerals of the three PIRA members shot at Gibraltar. The RUC bravely refused demands for the reintroduction of policing at the funeral of one of those killed during the attack on Milltown cemetery. But the most sickening scenes yet captured on film in Northern Ireland put paid to the RUC’s policy before any benefits could accrue. Although the RUC’s credibility was probably increased by the very public murder of two British soldiers, politicians fell over themselves to denounce the RUC’s decision not to police the funeral. The RUC is now once again faced with the difficult dilemma of PIRA funerals. Northern Ireland’s problems are undoubtedly compounded by short-sighted politicians whose careers have become dependent on the continuance of terrorism.
C. C. O’Brien, ‘Terrorism under Democratic Conditions’, in M. Crenshaw, (ed.) Terrorism, Legitimacy and Power (USA: Wesleyan University Press, 1983) p. 93.
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© 1990 Joanne Wright
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Wright, J. (1990). Conclusions. In: Terrorist Propaganda. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11714-7_8
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