The Nature of Signs and the Naturalness of Objects

Abstract

The history of the definition of sign is a tortuous route to follow, and others (Sebeok, 1976; Todorov, 1982; Deely, 1982; Eco, 1984) have mapped it in greater detail than I can here. But it will help to remind us of some of the major definitions¹ offered during the past. For example, Classical thinkers stressed the empirical nature of the sign, as Todorov argues, in order to link ‘things and states of mind ... by a motivated relation’ (1982:16) because they believed in a clear difference between things of the world and signs in the mind. So in Aristotle, the sign is divided into two parts of motivated sign and conventional symbol to reflect the differences between necessity and invention or between logic and language. Later, the Stoics examined the same problem and developed this empirical definition into a tripartite division of ‘the thing signified and the thing signifying and the thing existing’ (Todorov, 1982: 19) so they might more clearly reflect the ‘expressible’ nature of signs (Eco, 1984:32).

The roaring of lions, the howling of wolves, the raging of the stormy sea, and the destructive sword, are portions of eternity too great for the eye of man.

Blake, ‘Proverbs of Hell’