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Public Choice and Agricultural Policy: The Case of the CAP

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Issues in Contemporary Economics

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

Abstract

Is the reform of agricultural policies an unresolvable issue? Although such an extreme view can hardly be justified in rational terms, many agricultural economists in West Europe may emotionally be inclined to agree. Numerous reforms were proposed but the politicians could not be persuaded to reorganise the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This frustrating experience has been illustrated by Pelkmans (1985, p. 4) as follows:

Nevertheless, it appeared as if analytical arguments and nonpartisan advice were not heard. It looked as if the CAP decision-making framework tried to make itself immune to criticism by insulating itself. A long lingering doubt emerged in certain circles of agricultural economists: would there be any utility in forwarding yet another reform proposal, that would not be picked up? Was there any point in repeating the analysis to politicians who would not listen? Some concluded that the CAP was reform-resistant and it would be futile to throw good economics after such bad politics. A few specialists, however, drew a different inference. They began to ask the question why the CAP was so resistant to reform, why it incorporated turns and twists time and again that were the worst choices from an economic point of view, why were the politics and economics so far apart?

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Institute for Horticultural Economics, University of Hannover, Germany

    Dr Konrad Hagedorn

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  1. Dr Konrad Hagedorn
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, Cambridge University, UK

    Partha Dasgupta

  2. Department of Economics and Philosophy, Stanford University, California, USA

    Partha Dasgupta

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© 1991 Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited

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Hagedorn, K. (1991). Public Choice and Agricultural Policy: The Case of the CAP. In: Dasgupta, P. (eds) Issues in Contemporary Economics. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11579-2_3

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