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Equilibrium and Rationality: Context and History-Dependence

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Abstract

I will first argue that a full solution theory for non-co-operative games requires several levels of analysis — the self-enforcing aspect (‘equilibrium’) being only the first of them, and that each of those levels has its own invariance (‘context-independence’) requirements. Of those different levels, only the first is more or less well understood.

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Kenneth J. Arrow

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© 1991 International Economic Association

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Mertens, JF. (1991). Equilibrium and Rationality: Context and History-Dependence. In: Arrow, K.J. (eds) Issues in Contemporary Economics. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11573-0_13

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