Information and Regulation
The 1980s have witnessed renewed interest in the regulation of natural monopolies or oligopolies. Dissatisfaction has been expressed with the price, quality and cost performance of regulated firms and government contractors, leading to dramatic changes in the form of their regulation, for example, American Telephone and Telegraph in the USA and British Telecom in the United Kingdom. The prospect of achieving a common market within the European Community in 1992 has exposed the need for European Community regulation in addition to national regulations, as expressed for example in the new directives of the EC for government contracts.
KeywordsAdverse Selection Social Welfare Function Marginal Cost Price Natural Monopoly Incentive Constraint
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