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Information and Regulation

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Issues in Contemporary Economics

Part of the book series: International Economic Association Series ((IEA))

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Abstract

The 1980s have witnessed renewed interest in the regulation of natural monopolies or oligopolies. Dissatisfaction has been expressed with the price, quality and cost performance of regulated firms and government contractors, leading to dramatic changes in the form of their regulation, for example, American Telephone and Telegraph in the USA and British Telecom in the United Kingdom. The prospect of achieving a common market within the European Community in 1992 has exposed the need for European Community regulation in addition to national regulations, as expressed for example in the new directives of the EC for government contracts.

This paper is based on joint research with Jean Tirole.

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Kenneth J. Arrow

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© 1991 International Economic Association

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Laffont, JJ. (1991). Information and Regulation. In: Arrow, K.J. (eds) Issues in Contemporary Economics. International Economic Association Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11573-0_12

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