Abstract
In her paper to the Aristotelian Society in 1958, entitled ‘Moral Beliefs’,1 Mrs Foot says that she agrees with the assumption found in the Republic, ‘that if justice is not a good to the just man, moralists who recommend it as a virtue are perpetrating a fraud’ (p. 100). The example of justice is incidental to the main contention, namely, that virtues can only be recommended if they constitute a good to the virtuous man. If virtues do not constitute such a good, they are frauds. It becomes essential, therefore, given the above assumption, to decide in general whether virtues do constitute a good to the virtuous man; in other words, to decide whether it pays to be good.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
Notes
See Peter Winch: ‘Nature and Convention’, Proc. Arist. Soc., Vol. LX (1959–60).
I no longer hold this view for reasons given by R. F. Holland in ‘Is Goodness a Mystery?’, reprinted in Against Empiricism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), and acknowledged by Winch in his introduction to Ethics and Action. See pp. 244–5 of this collection.
See J. L. Evans, ‘Grade Not’, Philosophy, Jan. 1962.
‘The Limits of Purpose’, in J. L. Stocks, Morality and Purpose, ed. D. Z. Phillips (London: Routledge, 1970), p. 27.
Author information
Authors and Affiliations
Copyright information
© 1992 D. Z. Phillips
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Phillips, D.Z. (1992). Does It Pay To Be Good?. In: Interventions in Ethics. Swansea Studies in Philosophy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11539-6_9
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11539-6_9
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-11541-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-11539-6
eBook Packages: Palgrave Religion & Philosophy CollectionPhilosophy and Religion (R0)