Extended Deterrence

  • Michael J. Mazarr


As noted in chapter 1, current deterrence theory and practice is concerned not just with attacks on the homelands of the superpowers or central deterrence. It also labours under the demands of extended deterrence, the attempt to deter nuclear or conventional attack upon the allies of the superpowers through the threat of nuclear first use. Given the relative position of the two superpowers and their proximity to their allies, the problems of extended deterrence are almost unique to the United States. This chapter will examine that aspect of the deterrence debate; its analysis is specific to NATO, but its general conclusions about the infeasibility of extended deterrence are applic-able in many ways to other theatres as well.


Nuclear Weapon Flexible Response European Security Nuclear Deterrent Warsaw Pact 
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Copyright information

© Michael J. Mazarr 1991

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael J. Mazarr
    • 1
  1. 1.Center for Strategic and International StudiesUSA

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