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Abstract

To the USSR, the 1973 October War was the wrong war at the wrong time, for several reasons. Highly sceptical of the Arabs’ ability to wage a successful campaign, the Soviets feared that a Middle Eastern war would end in yet another Arab calamity which, in turn, might hamper the course of détente, to which the USSR was then committed, tarnish the prestige of Soviet weaponry, and lead the USSR’s Arab allies to conclude that the road to regaining their lost territories passed through the United States — the only power capable of forcing concessions on Israel.1

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Notes

  1. Interestingly, the linkage between resolutions 242 and 338 was not initiated by the Soviets. The USSR wanted Resolution 338 to include a demand for a complete Israeli withdrawal, and acquiesced in the American position only as a result of its conviction in the urgency of a ceasefire. See, G. Golan, ‘Soviet Decisionmaking in the Yom Kippur War’, in J. Valenta and W. C. Potter (eds), Soviet Decisionmaking for National Security, (London: Allen & Unwin, 1984) p. 208.

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  2. R. O. Freedman, Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East Since 1970, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 163

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  3. G. Golan and I. Rabinovich, ‘The Soviet Union and Syria’ in Y. Rö, The Limits to Power (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 221.

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  4. E. R. F. Sheehan, The Arabs, Israelis, and Kissinger (New York: Reader’s Digest Press, 1976) p. 196

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© 1991 Efraim Karsh

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Karsh, E. (1991). War and Disengagement. In: Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11482-5_6

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