Abstract
Analyses of international politics, especially great-power/small-state relationships, often fall within one of the following two broad categories: ‘the patron-client relationship’ and the ‘tail wags the dog’ (or, ‘the power of the weak’). The first mode of analysis argues that relationships between actors of unequal power and status favour, by and large, the patron, whose bargaining position is by definition better than that of the client. Such relations may range from a more or less symbiotic interaction to a situation of unilateral exploitation, and are based on reciprocity in the exchange of material goods or protection for services, loyalty and deference to the patron.1
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Notes
M. Handel, Weak States in the International System (London: Frank Cass, 1971) pp. 132–5.
S. Hoffmann, Gulliver’s Troubles, Or the Setting of American Foreign Policy (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968) pp. 39
A. Z. Rubinstein (ed.), Soviet and Chinese Influence in the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1975) p. 10.
P. Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: I. B. Tauris, 1988) pp. 185–6.
As early as 18 February 1973 Nixon received a message from Brezhnev which sought to impress upon him the imminence of war and the consequent urgency of a political initiative. Similar warnings were also conveyed to Kissinger three months later, during his discussions at Zavidovo. See, H. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown, 1982) pp. 209–10
M. Ma’oz, Syria Under Hafiz al-Asad: New Domestic and Foreign Policies (Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1975) p. 24.
For a detailed account of Soviet covert warnings conveyed to the US administration see E. Karsh, ‘Moscow and the Yom Kippur War: A Reappraisal’, Soviet-Jewish Affairs, vol. 16, no. 1 (1986) pp. 14–17.
L. Whetten, The Canal War: Four Power Conflict in the Middle East (Cambridge, MASS.: MIT Press, 1974) pp. 47
R. A. Hinnebusch, ‘Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria’, in B. Korany and A. E. Hillal Dessouki (eds), The Foreign Policies of Arab States (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984) p. 294
The arms embargo, however, was not lifted until Asad threatened to cancel the limited port services rendered to the Soviets in Tartus. Only then, in early 1977 were arms shipments to Syria restored to their full extent in accordance with previously signed agreements, thereby clearing the road for Soviet-Syrian reconciliation. See, E. Karsh, Soviet Arms Transfers to the Middle East in the 1970s (Tel Aviv: The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, 1983), JCSS Paper No. 22, pp. 13–14.
J. D. Singer and M. Small, ‘Formal Alliances 1835–1939’, in R. Friedman et al. (eds), Alliances in International Politics (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1970) p. 149.
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© 1991 Efraim Karsh
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Karsh, E. (1991). Moscow and Damascus: A Patron-Client Relationship?. In: Soviet Policy towards Syria since 1970. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11482-5_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11482-5_2
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