Conclusion

Abstract

The chief shortcoming of the Quebec resolutions, in the opinion of Frederic Rogers, was that so many interests had to be accommodated in a British North American union that the proposed scheme of government was ‘rather wanting in neatness and scientific character’.¹ Historians should certainly beware of implying neatness and scientific precision in attempting to explain why Confederation occurred in the 1860s. In the end, politicians in Canada, New Brunswick and Nova Scotia were able to put together majorities in favour of union. Various motives, different cocktails of incentive, played their part in each province, perhaps even in each individual. Arguments were advanced to state the case in as many different ways as possible in order to appeal to people who thought in many different ways. Some arguments were plausible and effective, some merely effective, others were tried but discarded when no roof resounded with appreciative cheers. To carry Confederation by majorities was to carry Confederation by coalitions, and coalition armies march to a cacophony of drumbeats. Historians can reconstruct the cut-and-thrust of debate and note that in 1867 those who favoured Confederation overcame those who opposed it, in the mainland provinces at least. Yet it can never be proved that Confederation triumphed on account of any one of those arguments, or of all of them woven into a package.