Abstract
Soviet leaders have compelling reasons for building a new strategic relationship with the United States. A post-nuclear world would be far more hospitable to the unique security requirements of the USSR.
‘Show me a country without nationalist problems, and I will move there right away.’
Mikhail S. Gorbachev
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© 1990 Gary L. Guertner
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Guertner, G.L. (1990). Soviet Incentives for Conventional Deterrence. In: Deterrence and Defence in a Post-Nuclear World. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11448-1_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11448-1_4
Publisher Name: Palgrave Macmillan, London
Print ISBN: 978-1-349-11450-4
Online ISBN: 978-1-349-11448-1
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