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People’s War: A Conceptual Odyssey

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Modern Chinese Defence Strategy
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Abstract

The Chinese slogan for defence development in since 1977 has been people’s war under modern conditions. To understand the implications of this statement in present and future defence planning, it is necessary to examine first the original concept of ‘people’s war’, prior to any analysis of the meaning of ‘modern conditions’, and then to examine the phrase as a whole.

One of the great characteristics of Mao’s military thought is its flexibility. Many elements can be changed while arguing that nothing has changed.

Gerald Segal, 19821

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Notes and References

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  21. See, for example, Wang Zhiyun and Jiang Shaowei, ‘An Inch of I.and - Notes on Yunnan Border Area’s Defense,’ Renmin Ribao, 12 August 1983, p. 4, in JPRS, China Report, 11 October 1983, p. 84, in which the slogans ‘fight for every inch of land’ and ‘fight to the death in defense of our positions’ are noted. Also of interest is the emphasis given to the defence of cities. Veteran marshal and Politburo member, Nie Rongzhen [Nieh Jung-chen], speaking at the 1978 National Militia Conference, stated: ‘Cities ... are our political, economic, and cultural centers and pivots of communication, and will be the enemy’s main targets for sabotage and capture. The defense and security of cities is of great significance to stabilizing the war situation, preserving our war potentials and supporting a protracted war’ (FBIS, Daily Report: People’s Republic of China, 9 August 1978, p. E7.) In another speech, delivered to the City Defence Symposium held in 1980 and reported by Jilin Ribao in March of that year, the First Secretary of the Jilin provincial party committee, Wang Enmao, said: ‘We should consider city defence construction as a strategic issue and never underestimate its importance.’ (Cited by Lee Ngok, ‘Chinese Strategic Thinking’, op. cit., p. 17.) Finally, the Com-manders’ Handbook, loc. cit., devotes attention to this within its section, ‘Defensive Warfare’.

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  24. Alastair I. Johnston, ‘Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Implications for Arms Control’, Journal of Northeast Asian Studies, vol. 2, 1983, p. 19.,

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  25. This type of adversary propaganda is apparent in the clandestine radio broadcasts examined in Rosita Dellios, ‘Clandestine Radio Broadcasts to China in Relation to PLA Dissatisfaction with the Chinese Leadership; in Proceedings of the 27th Annual Conference of the Australian Political Studies Association, Adelaide, 28–30 August 1985, vol. 3, pp. 360–94.

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© 1990 Rosita Dellios

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Dellios, R. (1990). People’s War: A Conceptual Odyssey. In: Modern Chinese Defence Strategy. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11049-0_2

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