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Verification of a Cut-Off in the Production of Fissile Material

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A Handbook of Verification Procedures
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Abstract

Fissile (fissionable) material, either plutonium or highly enriched uranium or both in combination, is an essential ingredient of any nuclear weapon. This is equally true of the first generation of pure fission weapons — such as those used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki — and more modern weapons which gain part of their yield from thermonuclear fusion. In the latter case, a fission explosion is required to ignite the fusion reaction.

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© 1990 Frank Barnaby

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Thompson, G. (1990). Verification of a Cut-Off in the Production of Fissile Material. In: Barnaby, F. (eds) A Handbook of Verification Procedures. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-11041-4_4

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