Postscript

Abstract

If truth be told, that warning given by Christopher Platt twenty years ago continues to be ignored by most economic historians in their search to identify and explain the causes of Britain’s economic decline before 1914. At one time or another almost every possible reason has been given an airing but no sooner is it exposed to the light than it fades away in the face of detailed research. What is being suggested here is not another contribution to the debate but a suggestion that the whole debate itself is based on mistaken assumptions. Sydney Pollard went so far as to hint in his 1989 book Britain’s Prime and Britain’s Decline that Britain remained Europe’s most successful economy right up to the First World War, and its performance was not necessarily one of decline but of adjustment and specialization.¹ When placed within the context of a dynamic and evolving world economy, Britain’s performance cannot be judged in terms of a static model, as Crafts and Thomas have tried to do with their assessment of comparative advantage.² Instead, it is necessary to investigate the relationships of that economy with the rest of the world, complex and fluctuating as that was, in order to determine whether the performance was one of success or failure and why.

As historians, we would be unwise to assume that we can judge business decisions by a kind of macro-economic hind-sight, by broad economic trends, by developments which may be clear enough to us now but which at the time covered more than a man's working lifetime.

D.C.M. Platt, Latin America and British Trade, 1806–1914

(London, 1972) p. 309.