Abstract
Seapower can be defined in two ways — one narrow, the other broad. The narrow definition is military power deployed at or from the sea, and for the purposes of this chapter, this is the one that will primarily be used. The broader definition, however, a nation’s general capability, both military and civil, to use the sea for economic and political advantage, cannot be separated from military seapower. Expressions of that capability are a nation’s fishing fleet, its offshore oil and gas platforms, its shipbuilding industry and, most of all, its merchant shipping fleet. Merchant ships still carry by weight the vast bulk of a growing amount of world trade. They remain a key form of sea use that military navies protect. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the American naval officer whose century-old writings still form the basis of modem seapower theory, went so far as to argue that: ‘The necessity of a navy in the restricted sense of the word springs, therefore, from the existence of a peaceful shipping and disappears with it.’1 Yet in the modern world the relationship of merchant shipping and state power has changed. Many ships owned by the nationals of Western capitalist states no longer fly the flags or are manned by the nationals of those same states. In an expression of economic liberalism that would have shocked Adam Smith, many Western merchantmen have been transferred to operating regimes and foreign flags that mean they are no longer clearly national assets. This has potentially highly significant implications for the availability of shipping to protect military power overseas when required and to sustain sea-dependent nations in crisis and war. It also means that when Western warships assert the freedom of the seas they sometimes face problems in defining which ships they may legitimately protect.
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Notes
A. T. Mahan, The Influente of Sea Power upon History 1660–1783 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1890), p. 26.
P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, 2nd edition, (London: Macmillan, 1983); Chapter 7 is entitled ‘Mahan v Mackinder’.
For the former see W. E. Livezey, Mahan on Sea Power (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, revised edition 1981).
For the latter D. M. Schuman, ‘Julian S. Corbett: Historian of British Maritime Policy from Drake to Jellicoe’ (London: Royal Historical Society, 1981) and the new edition of Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, and London: Brassey’s, 1988).
S. P. Huntington. ‘National Policy and the Trans Oceanic Navy’, US Naval Institute Proceedings, May 1954, pp. 488 and 491–2.
This is quoted in a stimulating brief survey of US naval thought 1945–55 by M. A. Palmer, Origins of the Maritime Strategy: American Naval Strategy in the First Postwar Decade (Washington: Naval Historical Center, 1988).
The most easily accessible description of NATO maritime strategy in this period is J. J. Sckolsky, ‘Canada and the Cold War at Sea 1945–68’ in W. A. B. Douglas (ed.), RCN in Transition 1910–85 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1988).
For Gorshkhov’s ideas see his two major works, ‘Navies in War and Peace’, published as Red Star Rising at Sea (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1974) and
The Seapower of the State (London: Pergamon, 1979).
S. Turner, ‘Missions of the US Navy’, Naval War College Review, March–April 1974.
One of the best descriptions of NATO’s current maritime strategy is Vice-Admiral Sir Geoffrey Dalton, ‘Nato’s Maritime Strategy’ in E. Ellingson (ed.), NATO and US Maritime Strategy; Diverging Interests or Co-operative Effort (Oslo: Norwegian Atlantic Committee, 1987), pp. 29–48.
An excellent account of the development of the US Maritime Strategy is J. B. Hattendorf, ‘The Evolution of the Maritime Strategy’, Naval War College Review, Summer 1988.
See, for example, J. J. Mearsheimer, ‘A Strategic Misstep: The Maritime Strategy and Deterrence in Europe’, International Security, Vol. 11, no. 2, Fall 1986.
N. Friedman, The US Maritime Strategy (London: Jane’s, 1988).
E. J. Grove, The Merchant Fleet and Deterrence (London: British Maritime Charitable Foundation, 1988).
Sir James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy 1919–79 (London: Macmillan, 1981), p. 39.
Ken Booth, Law, Force and Diplomacy at Sea (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985) pp. 181–2.
Sir James Cable, ‘Showing the Flag: Past and Present’, Naval Forces, III 1987, p. 38.
For the best study of naval arms control, see Rear-Admiral J. R. Hill, Naval Arms Control (London: Routledge, 1989).
Barry Buzan, A Sea of Troubles, Adelphi Paper No. 148 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1978).
Rear-Admiral J. R. Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (London: Croom Helm, 1986), Chapter 10.
This analysis is loosely based on that in M. A. Morris, Expansion of Third World Navies (London: Macmillan, 1987).
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© 1992 Eric Groves
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Grove, E. (1992). Seapower. In: Carey, R., Salmon, T.C. (eds) International Security in the Modern World. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10772-8_11
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