Abstract
Since the late 1970s especially, there has been an increasing number of calls from a variety of quarters for NATO to alter its military strategy. ‘Flexible Response’ which was formally adopted by the alliance in 1967 has, in the eyes of many commentators, either always lacked credibility or has suffered a progressive loss of whatever integrity it once possessed. As a situation of American supremacy in nuclear warfare capabilities gave way to one of parity between the USSR and the USA, and as the Warsaw Pact maintained or even increased the perceived dominance of its conventional forces over those of NATO, the latter alliance found itself in a deepening dilemma to which there were only two possible remedies. The first of these was to release more resources for defence, thus injecting vitality into the existing but ailing strategy of ‘Flexible Response’. Alternatively member states could agree to jettison that strategy altogether and embrace some new policy; nuclear deterrence and arsenals might still play some part in this, but their hitherto excessive — and largely impractical — role would be diminished in favour of greater emphasis on conventional forces.
‘You can always tell when you are making progress: the problems change.’
(John Foster Dulles)
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Notes and References
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© 1991 David Gates
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Gates, D. (1991). NATO and the Quest for Alternatives, 1949–89. In: Non-Offensive Defence. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10585-4_1
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