An Attempted Conspiracy: The Second Bernadotte Plan

Abstract

The deterioration of the truce and UN prestige in Palestine, coupled with the approaching UN Assembly, intensified London’s and Washington’s interest in influencing the Palestine mediation. In the short run the two powers were now quicker to table truce violations and other Palestine affairs at the Security Council — as they did, for instance, on 19 August following the Government House incident. At the same time both powers felt that the mediator should no longer be allowed to monopolise the search for a long-term settlement. On 6 August Ambassador Jessup wrote to his superiors that ‘to avoid a situation wherein the Mediator again makes proposals which are considered unrealistic by both sides and rejected by them’, a concerted US-UK view on what the desirable settlement should be must be quietly communicated to the mediator and then publicly supported.¹ During August Britain and the USA increasingly discussed Palestine in an attempt to revive their 28 May policy and bring the mediation efforts to a conclusion. The long absence of Bernadotte and Bunche from the Middle East reinforced the feeling that, if left alone, the mediator might soon lose control.