The First Truce: The Failure of Supervision

Abstract

During the four weeks of cease-fire beginning 11 June, known as the ‘first truce’, Bernadotte’s authority and chances to develop his mission continued to fluctuate, but ended in a decline. In the short run he was defeated by the failure to extend the truce beyond the prescribed four weeks, in which the so-called ‘first Bernadotte plan’ played a role; and in the longer run by his inability to maintain the military status quo, since the truce worked markedly in favour of Israel. These setbacks were only to a limited extent the result of his errors and resulted mainly from circumstances beyond his control. First of all, the UN and the TC Powers failed to provide him with an adequate supervision machinery. Secondly, both the Arab states (Transjordan notwithstanding) and Israel were convinced that more fighting would improve their position with regard to future negotiations. Finally, the USSR, barred from the UN peace-keeping mission, did much to incite war.