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The Elusive Political Solution

  • John David Orme

Abstract

If reformist intervention is not attempted or is not successful, the time may come when the opposition can no longer be appeased or weakened by changes in policy but can only be satisfied by a fundamental alteration of the regime itself. The past performance of the United States government in these situations has been bitterly attacked both by critics on the left and critics on the right. The experience of the recent past, however, has provided little support for either view.

Keywords

York Time Armed Force Political Instability Reagan Administration American Policy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Notes

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Copyright information

© John David Orme 1989

Authors and Affiliations

  • John David Orme
    • 1
  1. 1.Oglethorpe UniversityAtlantaUSA

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