EURATOM is the organisation which is today entrusted with the task of implementing nuclear safeguards in the European Community. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also conducts its own safeguards verification activities in the territories of the Community Member States. But as a result of developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it is EURATOM which has the initial responsibility for ensuring effective safeguards implementation in this particular region.
KeywordsMember State International Atomic Energy Agency Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Industry Nuclear Submarine
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- 2.B. Goldschmidt, The Atomic Complex: A Worldwide Political History of Nuclear Energy (La Grange Park, Illinois: American Nuclear Society, 1982), p. 383.Google Scholar
- 4.For a brief introduction which includes many of these aspects, see A. S. Krass, Verification. How Much Is Enough? (London & Philadelphia: Taylor & Francis for SIPRI, 1985) pp. 89–98.Google Scholar
- 5.W. C. Potter, Nuclear Power and Nonproliferation (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1982) p. 209.Google Scholar
- 7.For a discussion of the technical deficiencies of safeguards, see for example: A. B. Lovins, L. H. Lovins and P. O’Hefferman, The First Nuclear World War (London: Hutchinson, 1983);Google Scholar
- and especially in the light of the Israeli bombing of Iraq’s Osiraq nuclear reactor in 1981 which was under IAEA safeguards, see S. Moglewer, ‘IAEA Safeguards and Non-proliferation’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 1981, pp. 24–8;Google Scholar
- and S. Feldman, ‘The Bombing of Osiraq Revisited’, International Security, vol. 7, No. 1, Fall 1982.Google Scholar
- 8.For a critical study of the affair, see E. Davenport, P. Eddy and P. Gillman, The Plumb at Affair (London: André Deutsch, 1978).Google Scholar
- 10.J. M. De Montmollin et al., ‘On IAEA Safeguards’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1982, pp. 39–41.Google Scholar
- 11.See for example, N. A. Sims, International Organization for Chemical Disarmament, SIPRI Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies, No. 8 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).Google Scholar
- 16.For an analysis of the problems such dissemination raises for nuclear safeguards policies, see B. Sanders and J. Simpson, ‘Nuclear Submarines and Non-Proliferation: Cause for Concern’, PPNN Occasional Paper Number Two (Programme For Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation, Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Southampton, England, 1988).Google Scholar
- 17.J. Simpson, The Independent Nuclear State. The United States, Britain and the Military Atom, 2nd edition (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986) p. 5.Google Scholar
- 18.See especially, L. Scheinman, The International Atomic Energy Agency and World Nuclear Order (Washington DC: Resources for the Future, 1987).Google Scholar
- Also related to this theme is M. Imber, ‘Mitrany’s Functionalism, The International Atomic Energy Agency, and the Development of Safeguards Against the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,’ PhD thesis, Southampton University, 1982.Google Scholar