Skip to main content

Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe

  • Chapter
Military Power in Europe

Part of the book series: Studies in International Security ((SIS))

  • 18 Accesses

Abstract

Since the early 1950s, the security of Western Europe and the full participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO have been seen to rest on two fundamental military prerequisites. The first is a common commitment to immediate forward defence at the inner-German border. The second is the existence of an integrated peacetime Western military organization, particularly the continuous political and military risk-sharing of Europe and the United States embodied in the ‘layer cake’ structure of forces in the Central Region. Large, well equipped, standing conventional forces were needed for both prerequisites, for purposes of both deterrence and warfighting. And while the capabilities NATO raised never approached the goals of military planners or prevented dependence on tactical nuclear supplements, active Western forces from the late 1960s to the late 1980’s totalled at least one million men and over 300,000 major equipment items.2

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Notes

  1. For details from the Western perspective, see NATO, Conventional Balance: The Facts (Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 1988).

    Google Scholar 

  2. For details on the now-ended MBFR experience, see John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).

    Google Scholar 

  3. For an earlier attempt in an earlier atmosphere of impending change see: Warner R. Schilling, William T. R. Fox, Catherine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Pachala, American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).

    Google Scholar 

  4. See the Rapacki, Kennan, and Gromyko plans discussed in Robert Osgood, NATO The Entangling Alliance, ch. 10 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

    Google Scholar 

  5. Kennan’s ideas were developed in the 1957 Reith Lectures, reprinted in: George Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York: Harper, 1958).

    Google Scholar 

  6. General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Gorbachev and the Future of East–West Security: A Response for the Mid Term (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, April 1989).

    Google Scholar 

  7. For a discussion of some of the difficulties barrier proponents have faced from Colonel von Bonin in the early 1950s to Inspector General Trettner in the 1960s, see Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Copyright information

© 1990 The International Institute for Strategic Studies

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kelleher, C.M. (1990). Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe. In: Freedman, L. (eds) Military Power in Europe. Studies in International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10310-2_8

Download citation

Publish with us

Policies and ethics