Abstract
Since the early 1950s, the security of Western Europe and the full participation of the Federal Republic of Germany in NATO have been seen to rest on two fundamental military prerequisites. The first is a common commitment to immediate forward defence at the inner-German border. The second is the existence of an integrated peacetime Western military organization, particularly the continuous political and military risk-sharing of Europe and the United States embodied in the ‘layer cake’ structure of forces in the Central Region. Large, well equipped, standing conventional forces were needed for both prerequisites, for purposes of both deterrence and warfighting. And while the capabilities NATO raised never approached the goals of military planners or prevented dependence on tactical nuclear supplements, active Western forces from the late 1960s to the late 1980’s totalled at least one million men and over 300,000 major equipment items.2
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Notes
For details from the Western perspective, see NATO, Conventional Balance: The Facts (Brussels, NATO Press Service, November 1988).
For details on the now-ended MBFR experience, see John G. Keliher, The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980).
For an earlier attempt in an earlier atmosphere of impending change see: Warner R. Schilling, William T. R. Fox, Catherine M. Kelleher, and Donald J. Pachala, American Arms and a Changing Europe: Dilemmas of Deterrence and Disarmament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973).
See the Rapacki, Kennan, and Gromyko plans discussed in Robert Osgood, NATO The Entangling Alliance, ch. 10 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).
Kennan’s ideas were developed in the 1957 Reith Lectures, reprinted in: George Kennan, Russia, the Atom and the West (New York: Harper, 1958).
General Andrew J. Goodpaster, Gorbachev and the Future of East–West Security: A Response for the Mid Term (Washington, DC: The Atlantic Council, April 1989).
For a discussion of some of the difficulties barrier proponents have faced from Colonel von Bonin in the early 1950s to Inspector General Trettner in the 1960s, see Catherine M. Kelleher, Germany and the Politics of Nuclear Weapons (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
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© 1990 The International Institute for Strategic Studies
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Kelleher, C.M. (1990). Indicators of Defensive Intent in Conventional Force Structures and Operations in Europe. In: Freedman, L. (eds) Military Power in Europe. Studies in International Security. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10310-2_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10310-2_8
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