National Planning in an Alliance Context

Abstract

Much ink and mental effort have been expended in the attempt to explain why and how wars are won. Yet an equal number of wars are self-evidently lost, and the reasons for loss are at least as well worth exploring. They are by no means necessarily, or even often, simply the obverse of the reasons why the victors succeeded. The causes may be elementary: perhaps the vanquished were merely outclassed in numbers or weapons or training. If so, their commanders should have known it and declined battle. Perhaps the losing warriors had no stomach for the fight, or not enough. Probably this is the commonest cause, and the growing literature devoted to morale in battle goes far towards illuminating it. But there are many instances where equality, if not superiority, in numbers, weapons, training and even morale has resulted only in ignominious defeat. Two conspicuous examples, drawn from the recent history of war on land, are the French failure against the Germans in 1940, and the Russian débâcle in the following year. On the Western front the Allies fielded 144 divisions against 141 on the German side. In the East the Russians outnumbered the Germans by a factor of four in tanks and twice in combat aircraft. In both cases the defenders were overwhelmed. These examples call into question the fashionable thesis that in defence an inferiority of three to one is tolerable.