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Policy Implications of Administrative Reform

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Book cover Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan

Part of the book series: St Antony’s/Macmillan Series ((STANTS))

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Abstract

In March 1981, an advisory body, the Provisional Commission on Administrative Reform (Rinji Gyõsei Chōsakai abbreviated as Rinchō) was set up in the Prime Minister’s Office. According to its Establishment Law, the Commission was to consist of nine members who were appointed by the prime minister with the consent of the Diet from among ‘persons having knowledge and sound judgement concerning the problem of administrative reform’.1 In practice, the membership consisted of three members from the business world (including the chairman, Dokō Toshio), two from labour unions, two from the Civil Service (former administrative vice-ministers of the Ministries of Finance and Home Affairs), one from journalism and one from the academic world. In carrying out their duties, the above-mentioned members were assisted by expert members, twenty-one in all, many of whom came from the business world. As the word ‘Provisional’ suggests, the duration of the Commission was limited, in fact, to two years. The Commission presented five reports to the prime minister in the two years of its existence, and was dissolved in May 1983.

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Notes

  1. Maki Taro, ‘Rinchō gohyakunichi no kiseki’ [The Five Hundred Day Course of the Rincho], Sekai (September 1982) p. 63.

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  2. Saito Taijun, Seisaku keisei katei no kenkyū [Studies of the Policy Formation Process] (Gyōsei, 1984) p. 55.

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  3. Furuhashi Genrokuro, Nihon ni okeru sengo gyōsei kaikaku no keii [The Process of Postwar Administrative Reform in Japan], paper to Tokyo Round Table, International Institute of Administrative Sciences (14 September 1982).

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  4. See John C. Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1977).

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  5. Matsuda Takatoshi, ‘Gyosei kaikaku no totatsuten’ [Achievements of Administrative Reform], Hōritsu Jihō vol. 53, no. 4 (March 1981) pp. 32–7.

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  6. The practice of setting ceilings itself was first introduced in 1974. However, ceilings were incremental until the rule was revised in 1981. See Saito, op. cit., pp. 21–2. See also Kato Yoshitarō, Nihon no Yosan Kaikaku (Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 1981).

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  7. James Elliott, ‘The 1981 Administrative Reform in Japan’, Asian Survey vol. xxiii, no. 6 (June 1983) p. 775.

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  8. See, for example, Fujioka Bunshichi and Nishikawa Masao, ‘Naze isogu zaisei saiken’ [Why Do They Rush Financial Reconstruction?], ESP, Economic Planning Agency (April 1982) pp. 24–9.

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  9. Uchida Tadao, ‘Gyozaisei kaikaku no hihan to hyoka’ [A Critical Assessment of Administrative and Financial Reform], Gendai Keizai vol. 44 (Autumn 1981) pp. 15–16.

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  10. See, for example, Yoshida Kazuo, ‘Zaisei saiken no hōto’ [A Measure for Financial Reconstruction], ESP, Economic Planning Agency (July 1980) pp. 66–71.

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  11. Sasaki Haruo, Rinchō to gyösei kaikaku’ [The Rinchō and Administrative Reform], paper to the Annual Conference of the Japanese Society for Public Administration, Sapporo (10 June 1983). Incidentally, devices similar to ‘foreign pressures’ are utilised frequently in Japan.

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  12. For example, in the case of the Ministry of International Trade and Industry, see Kodama Fumio, ‘Policy Innovation at MITI’, Japan Echo vol. xi, no. 2 (1984) pp. 66–7.

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  13. Jin Ikkō, Okura kanryō (Treasury Bureaucrats) (Kiidansha, 1982) p. 10.

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  14. See, for example, Dōmoto Seiji, ‘Seisaku keisei katei no shisutemu’ [System of Policy Formation], Jurisuto, Special Issue no. 29 (January 1983) pp. 56–63.

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  15. Kojima Akira, ‘Budgetary System and Politics’, in Administrative Management in Japan Institute of Administrative Management (March 1982) p. 61.

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  16. On the political background to an increase in defence expenditure see J. A. A. Stockwin, Japan: Divided Politics in a Growth Economy, 2nd edn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), pp. 253–4.

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© 1988 J. A. A. Stockwin

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Itō, D. (1988). Policy Implications of Administrative Reform. In: Dynamic and Immobilist Politics in Japan. St Antony’s/Macmillan Series. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10297-6_4

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