Abstract
Any analysis of the West’s ability to use force in the Middle East must carefully consider the match between the potential need for the use of force and the range of scenarios that may occur. This is not simply a matter of analysing the kind of high probability scenarios discussed in Chapter 2. The problem with the Middle East, as with most areas in the Third World where the West may have to use military force, is that real world cases tend to be the result of unexpected crises and not of predictable contingencies and long-term trends.
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Notes
The detailed limitations in individual NATO ships can be found in Jane’s Fighting Ships, 1984–1985. For a summary discussion of some of the issues involved see RUSI-Brassey’s International Weapons Developments (London: Brasseys, 1980), pp. 62–92; and Doug Richardson, Naval Armament (London: Janes, 1981), especially pp. 16–5
The US has made major strides in prepositioning and improving its air-and sea-lift. Nevertheless, it still will be very severely limited in this respect in any move of division or wing-sized USCENTCOM forces well into the mid-1990s. See Caspar W. Weinberger, Annual Report to Congress, FY 1986 (Washington, DC; Department of Defense), Febru-ary 1985 pp. 193–204; OJCS, Military Posture, FY 1986 (Washington, DC; Department of Defense), 1985, pp. 49–50 and 69–76.
Estimate based on, Military Balance, 1985–1986 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986), and the data furnished by Depart-ment of Defence, Public Affairs, January 1986.
For an excellent recent treatment of US build-up capabilities in the region, see Thomas McNaugher, Arms and Oil (Washington, DC; Brookings Institute), 1985, pp. 53–89.
These comments and the following out of area force data are based on various editions of the International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance; Peter Foot, Beyond The North Atlantic: The European Contribution, ASIDES, Aberdeen, No. 21, Spring 1982; William T. Tow, ‘NATO’s Out of Region Challenges and Extended Containment’, Orbis, Vol. 28, No. 4, Winter, 1985, pp. 829–56; Paul E. Gallis, The NATO Allies, Japan, and the Persian Gulf, Report No. 84–184F, Washington, Congressional Research Service, 8 November 1984; John Chipman, French Military Policy and African Security, Adelphi Paper 201 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1985); and Anthony H. Cordesman, NATO Out of Area Contingency Options for the 1980s, LASL (Los Alamos Scientific Laboratories) White Paper, 28 September 1984.
For a full description of the Garibaldi see Antony Preston and Antonio O. Ciampi, ‘Garibaldi - Pride of the Italian Fleet’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 22 February 1986, pp. 318–19. Both British and French carrier groups have limited to moderate air and missile and AEW assets, but neither has sufficient assets to protect any significant number of allied vessels.
For a good discussion of the issues involved see Luigi Caligaris, ‘Possible Scenarios for an Italian Rapid Deployment Force’, The International Spectator, Vol. 20, Nos. 3/4, July-December 1985, pp. 64–87; and Maurizio Cremasco, ‘An Italian Rapid Deployment Force: The Geo-political Context’, The International Spectator, Vol. 20, No. 2, April-June 1985, pp. 51–61.
Special Correspondent, ‘Guarding Turkey’s Eastern Flank’, The Middle East, April 1986, pp. 9–10.
This estimate is based on working data from DMS, various editions of Jane’s Defence Weekly, and the IISS, Military Balance, 1985–1986.
Andrew Borowiec, ‘Turks Seek Aid to Upgrade Army’, Washington Times, 16 May 1986, p. 7.
The Crotale is only effective to about 12 000 feet versus up to 52 000 feet for Hawk. As a result, the SAMs transportable on French lift aircraft cannot reach medium and heavy bombers. Although France deployed only 900 men, it also had to move its twenty-four armoured vehicles by land from the Cameroons since it lacked airlift for such vehicles (Jane’s Defence Weekly, 15 March 1986, p. 454).
For a good recent description of the goals of the French Navy, see Pierre Lachamade, ‘The French Navy in the Year 2000’, Jane’s Naval Review (London: Jane’s, 1985), pp. 79–90. This precludes recent budget cuts but still indicates the probable future strengths and weaknesses of French naval out-of-area capabilities.
Jean de Galard, ‘French Overseas Action: Supplementary Budget’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 14 December 1985, p. 1281.
For illustrative British views see Lt. General Sir Geoffrey Howlett, `NATO European Interests Worldwide - Britain’s Military contribution, RUSI Journal, Vol. 130, No. 3, September, 1985, pp. 3–10; Simon O. Dwyer-Russel, ‘Beyond the Falklands: The Role of Britain’s Out of Area Joint Forces’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 January 1986, pp. 26–7; `Battle Continues to Preserve British Amphibious Warfare Capability’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 8 February 1986, p. 185; `UK’s Amphibious Dilemma’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 12 April 1986, pp. 661–2; Professor Neville Brown, ‘An Out-of-Area Strategy?’, Navy International, October 1982, pp. 1371–3; and Keith Hartley, ‘Can Britain Afford a Rapid Deployment Force?’, RUSI Journal, Vol. 127, No. 1, March 1982, pp. 18–22.
See Simon O. Dwyer-Russel, ‘Marines Fear Loss of Capability’, Defence Attache, No. 3, 1984, pp. 60–8; and ‘Beyond the Falklands: The Role of Britain’s Out-of-Area Joint Forces’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 11 January 1986, pp. 26–7.
Department of Defense, Annual Report, FY 1987, Washington, 5 February 1986, p. 63–4.
See the author’s The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability (Boulder, Colo: Westview, 1984), pp. 803–63 and Thomas L. McNaugher, Arms and Oil (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), pp. 23–46.
For more detailed treatment of Soviet attitudes and methods of inter-vention see Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution); Efraim Karsh, The Cautious Bear, Tel Aviv; Jaffee Center, 1985, and Alex P. Schmid, Soviet Military Interventions Since 1945 (Oxford: Transaction Books, 1985).
For more background see The Gulf and Strategic Stability, op.cit. (see Note 17), pp. 848–63, and McNaugher, Arms and Oil, op.cit. (see Note 4), pp. 23–87. Also see Robert P. Haifa, The Half War: Planning US Rapid Deployment Forces to Meet a Limited Contingency, 1960–1983 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1985), pp. 17–131.
For a good analysis of the role of Western forces during the mining of the Red Sea in July-September, 1984, see Captain John Moore, ‘Red Sea Mines, A Mystery No Longer’, Jane’s Naval Review (New York: Jane’s, 1985), pp. 64–7, and Scott C. Truver, ‘Mines of August: An International Whodunnit’, Naval Review, May 1985, Proceedings, Annapolis, pp. 95–117.
For a full discussion of the problems and issues involved see Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn, Military Lessons of the Falklands Islands War (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), pp. 7–51, and 83–127, and Jeffrey Ethell and Alfred Price, Air War South Atlantic (London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1983), pp. 34–100 and 157–213.
Department of Defense News Release, No. 18–86, 14 January 1986, p. 1.
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© 1989 Joseph I. Coffey and Gianni Bonvicini
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Cordesman, A.H. (1989). The Uses of Force in the Middle East. In: Coffey, J.I., Bonvicini, G. (eds) The Atlantic Alliance and the Middle East. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10250-1_3
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