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Abstract

Five years ago, President Ronald Reagan, in his speech of 23 March 1983, revealed to the world his dream of a defence against strategic ballistic missiles which would ‘render nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete.1 The problem and the solution were both clear in his mind: although deterrence of nuclear war by threat of retaliation had worked, the US and its allies deserved better than to base their security on the threat of destruction of another society. It was this dream that the President shared with the American people — a defence so perfect that not only would Soviet nuclear weapons be rendered impotent but our own would be rendered unnecessary.

This chapter is based on several of my previous writings on the SDI. I have incorporated the most recent developments till early June 1987. I am grateful to the publishers mentioned in the acknowledgements for their permission to use sections of my earlier publications. The views expressed in this chapter are my own and not those of the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center or of Columbia University, New York.

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Notes

  1. See President Reagan’s 23 March 1983 ‘Speech on Defense Spending and Defensive Technology’, in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Monday, 28 March 1983, Vol. 19, no. 12, pp. 423–66.

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  2. Arms Control Association, Star War Quotes ( Washington, DC: Arms Control Association, 1986 ).

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  3. For the early debate see Richard L. Garwin and Hans A. Bethe, ‘Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems’, Scientific American, Vol. 218, no. 3 (March 1968), pp. 21–31;

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  8. See John B. Rhinelander, ‘Implications of US and Soviet BMD programmes for the ABM Treaty’, in Bhupendra Jasani (ed.), Space Weapons and International Security ( Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 ), pp. 145–61;

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  9. Rhinelander, ‘The ABM Treaty-Its Evolution, Interpretation and Grey Areas and an Official Attempt at Reinterpretation, in Hans Günter Brauch (ed.), Star Wars and European Defence, Implications for Europe — Perceptions and Assessments (London: Macmillan and New York: St Martin’s Press, 1987 ) pp. 373–435.

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  19. E. Walbridge, in ‘Angle Constraint for Nuclear-pumped X-ray Laser Weapons’, Nature, 19 July 1984, and previous authors have noted that the super-radiant beam has a contribution to angular half-width by diffraction αd = 1.22λD, and by geometry (from skew rays in the wire) αg = D/L, with λ the X-ray wavelength (about 1.2 nm for 1 keV x-ray), D wire diameter, and L the wire length. For L = 2 m, the total angular beam spread is minimum at α = 1.5λL)1/2, or about 40 microradians, at a wire diameter D = (1.22λL)1/2, or some 55 µm.

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  30. Caspar Weinberger, Annual Report to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1988 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, January 1987), pp. 51–4, 281–8.

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  31. Richard L. Garwin, letter to the Editor, Los Angeles Times, 24 October 1986.

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© 1989 Hans Günter Brauch

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Garwin, R.L. (1989). SDI — A Sceptical Assessment by an American Physicist. In: Brauch, H.G. (eds) Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10221-1_9

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