Abstract
For several decades strategic stability in the world has rested on the principle of mutual nuclear deterrence (or mutually assured destruction — MAD). This principle implies that either of the opposing sides can inflict a devastating nuclear strike with unacceptable consequences for the other side in response to the nuclear first strike.1
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Notes
For a more elaborate development of the argument presented in this chapter see specifically: Yevgeni Velikhov, Roald Sagdeev and Andrei Kokoshin (eds), Weapons in Space: The Dilemma of Security ( Moscow: Mir Publishers, 1986 ), pp. 106–27.
Robert Oppenheimer, ‘Atomic Weapons and the Crisis in Science’, Saturday Review of Literature, 24 November 1945.
Paul Nitze, ‘On the Road to a More Stable Peace’, Current Policy, No. 657 ( Washington: US Department of State, February 1985 ).
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© 1989 Hans Günter Brauch
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Sagdeev, R. (1989). Star Wars and Strategic Stability. In: Brauch, H.G. (eds) Military Technology, Armaments Dynamics and Disarmament. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10221-1_10
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10221-1_10
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