U.S. Government Organization for Arms Control Verification and Compliance

  • Michael Krepon

Abstract

Under the National Security Act of 1947, the president of the United States has considerable latitude in organizing the executive branch of government for national security affairs. This act establishes a National Security Council (NSC), but it makes no mention of the president’s assistant for national security affairs and the NSC staff. The act further seeks to “enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security,” but does not mandate procedures as to how this objective might be accomplished.

Keywords

Radar Milo Penta Stake 

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Notes and References

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Copyright information

© Michael Krepon and Mary Umberger 1988

Authors and Affiliations

  • Michael Krepon

There are no affiliations available

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