Abstract
Under the National Security Act of 1947, the president of the United States has considerable latitude in organizing the executive branch of government for national security affairs. This act establishes a National Security Council (NSC), but it makes no mention of the president’s assistant for national security affairs and the NSC staff. The act further seeks to “enable the military services and the other departments and agencies of the government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security,” but does not mandate procedures as to how this objective might be accomplished.
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Notes and References
Thomas Wolfe, The Salt Experience (Cambridge: Ballinger Publishing Company, 1979);
U.S. Congress, House Select Committee on Intelligence, U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Risks and Control of Foreign Intelligence, Hearings Part V, 1976 (hereafter referred to as the Pike Committee Hearings);
Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation, American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1985);
Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982);
Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979);
John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1973);
Gerard Smith, Doubletalk (New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc., 1980);
Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978);
Gerald R. Ford, A Time to Heal, The Autobiography of Gerald R. Ford (New York: Harper & Row, 1979);
Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith, Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982);
U. Alexis Johnson, Jet Olivarius McAllister, The Right Hand of Power (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1984);
Rose E. Gottemoeller, “Evolution of the U.S. Organizational Setup for Dealing with SALT,” P-6197 The RAND Corporation, November, 1978;
Alton Frye, “U.S. Decision-Making for SALT,” SALT, Agreements and Beyond, Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander (eds.) (New York: The Free Press, 1974), pp. 66–101.
See Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp.47–97; Henry Kissinger, White House Years, pp.212, 540–9; and the Murphy Commission Report, Part V, 1975, p.336.
For lengthier treatments of the MIRV issue, see Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision-Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1975);
Ronald L. Tammen, MIRV and the Arms Race, An Interpretation of Defense Strategy (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).
R. Jeffrey Smith, “Administration at Odds over Soviet Cheating,” Science, vol. 228, May 10, 1985, pp. 695–6;
R. Jeffrey Smith, “Scientists Fault Charges of Soviet Cheating,” Science, vol. 220, May 13, 1983, pp. 695–7;
Michael Krepon, “CIA, DIA at Odds Over Soviet Threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, vol. 43, May 1987, pp. 6–7.
See Michael Krepon, “How Reagan Is Killing A Quiet Forum For Arms Talks,” Washington Post, August 31, 1986, p.D-1.
See Leo Sartori, “Will SALT II Survive?” International Security, vol. 10, no. 3, Winter 1985/86, pp.147–74;
James A. Schear, “Arms Control Treaty Compliance: Buildup to a Breakdown,” International Security, vol. 10, no. 2, Fall 1985, pp. 141–82;
Michael Krepon, “Look Who’s Snubbing SALT Now,” Washington Post, December 16, 1986, p.A19.
See, for example, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Threshold Test Ban Treaty and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty, Hearings, 1987;
R. Jeffrey Smith, “Dispute over Soviet Testing Heats Up,” Science, May 31, 1985, vol. 228, p. 1072.
See Raymond L. Garthoff, Policy Versus the Law, The Reinterpretation of the ABM Treaty (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1987).
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© 1988 Michael Krepon and Mary Umberger
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Krepon, M. (1988). U.S. Government Organization for Arms Control Verification and Compliance. In: Krepon, M., Umberger, M. (eds) Verification and Compliance. Palgrave Macmillan, London. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10143-6_14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-349-10143-6_14
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