The Soviet Union, East Asia and the West: the Kremlin’s Calculus of Opportunities and Risks

Abstract

Some eighteen months have now passed since Mikhail Gorbachev became the leader of the Soviet Union, enough time for him to have left a visible imprint upon Soviet policy in East Asia. In appraising what Gorbachev has done, and what his hopes and intentions are likely to be in the region, four broad questions seem appropriate. First, what lines of policy — military, political, economic — did he inherit? What Soviet vested interests have been created by the momentum of past policies to impinge on Gorbachev’s choices? And what have been the effects of past Soviet behaviour on the Soviet position in the region? Second, what objective changes have been occurring in the Asian-Pacific political environment? To what degree have they been linked with developments in the West? To what extent do trends confronting the Soviet Union threaten to complicate or worsen the Soviet overall position, and to what extent do they open new opportunities for Soviet policy? Third, what has been Gorbachev’s response to date? What aspects of his behaviour in Asia are a continuation of long-established Soviet policies, and what aspects contain innovations? To what extent is he likely to break new ground in the future? Fourth, what are the probable consequences of the present mix of Soviet policies for Western interests?